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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis seeks to address the impact of the Greek debt crisis on the stability of 
the euro and Eurozone, and the best solutions to the crisis. The chapters of this study 
explore currency unions in theory and practice, the operational components of the 
Eurozone, fiscal policy and its importance in Eurozone maintenance, and provide an 
overview of the events leading up to the Greek debt crisis. It analyzes strategies 
implemented so far to solve the crisis, looks at shifts in interest rates on Greek debt 
bonds, and performs a comparative analysis of previous currency unions that failed in 
an attempt to draw lessons from those examples. The study provides evidence that the 
current tools utilized to stabilize Greece are unsustainable over time, and if Germany 
does not provide adequate aid, Greece will further default on its debt, which will lead to 
significant implications for the Eurozone in the future. 
 The global financial crisis of 2008 was extremely detrimental to the financial and 
economic well-being of countries, organizations, and individuals worldwide. Those 
reaping the benefits of an economic boom suddenly found the world in economic 
turmoil, with the downward spiral of financial markets forcing many to question the 
stability the longevity of the crisis. Since late 2009, conservative investors have 
expressed their fears that a sovereign debt crisis will develop within Europe, and put the 
future of the Eurozone at risk. While increases in sovereign debt load have been most 
pronounced in only a few Eurozone member nations, they are becoming increasingly 
problematic for the currency union as a whole. 
 The European Union continues to call on Greece to implement austerity 
measures in order to reduce debt and cut spending. Past measures to counter the debt 
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crisis have focused on  providing the country with multi-billion euro bailout packages in 
exchange for implementing austerity. The majority of Greek citizens continue to publicly 
reject these measures, even with knowledge of the benefits some austerity measures 
and bailouts will have for Greece. 
 As of this publication, Greece has partially defaulted. In March 2012, following a 
second EU/IMF bailout and austerity measures, private sector holders of Greek debt 
agreed to a debt-swap, with write off losses of $141.4 billion as a part of the debt 
exchange. While the effects have not been widely felt, further default will severely 
impact the future of the Eurozone. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - Crisis in Greece 
 
 
 As of this publication, Greece has partially defaulted. In March 2012, following a 
second EU/IMF bailout and austerity measures, private sector holders of Greek debt 
agreed to a debt-swap, with write off losses of $141.4 billion as a part of the debt 
exchange. While the effects thus far have not been too widespread, a further default will 
severely impact the Eurozone. The implications will be detrimental to the value of the 
euro, the financial stability of European countries, the stability of governments in the 
region, and the stability of banks invested in Greek debt as well as individual nations 
affected by a default. This financial turmoil will bring about increased changes in 
government with a potential for weak political leadership, and increased austerity 
measures to decrease national deficits.  
 This study seeks to address the impact of the Greek debt crisis on the stability of 
the euro and Eurozone, and what would be the best solutions to the crisis. It analyzes 
strategies implemented so far to solve the crisis, looks at shifts in interest rates on 
Greek debt bonds, and performs a comparative analysis of previous currency unions 
that failed in an attempt to draw lessons from those examples. The study provides 
evidence that the current tools utilized to stabilize Greece are unsustainable over time, 
and if Germany does not provide adequate aid, Greece will further default on its debt, 
which will lead to significant implications for the Eurozone in the future. The Latin 
Monetary Union of 19th century Europe provides a vivid example of what the Eurozone 
may evolve into if appropriate measures are not taken, while the 2002 Argentine 
financial crisis provides an example of what further Greek default may entail. 
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 The research finds that recent measures taken by the European Union to counter 
the European sovereign debt crisis have begun to slightly improve the stability of the 
Eurozone. However, further political, economic, fiscal, and national integration, as well 
as a method to implement sanctions against member nations who do not abide by 
Eurozone guidelines, are imperative in order to return the euro's stability to pre-crisis 
levels. 
 The global financial crisis of 2008 significantly impacted the financial and 
economic well-being of countries, organizations, and individuals worldwide. Those who 
were accustomed to enjoying the benefits of an economic boom suddenly found 
themselves in economic turmoil, with the downward spiral of financial markets forcing 
many to question the stability of their home country, and the longevity of the crisis. 
Since late 2009, conservative investors have expressed their fears that a sovereign 
debt crisis will develop within Europe, and put the future of the Eurozone at risk. While 
increases in sovereign debt load have been most pronounced in only a few Eurozone 
member nations, they are becoming increasingly problematic for the currency union as 
a whole. Moreover, since April 2010, global markets have become concerned about the 
size of Greek's public debt, and how a Greek default would affect the Eurozone. The 
uncertainties surrounding it continue to instill fear and distrust in Greece's financial 
legitimacy amongst the international community. How will the Greek debt crisis impact 
the Eurozone, and what are the best solutions to the crisis?  
 The European Union (EU) has called on Greece to implement austerity 
measures in order to reduce debt and cut spending. Past measures to counter the debt 
crisis, however, have involved providing the country with multi-billion euro bailout 
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packages funded by the EU, IMF, and banks within wealthy Eurozone nations. The 
majority of Greek citizens continue to reject these measures, many publicly, even with 
knowledge of the benefits the austerity measures and bailouts will have for Greece. 
They often express their dissatisfaction in these measures with angry, and sometimes 
violent, street protests.1 Shortly after Greek bailouts in 2010 and 2011 were approved 
by lenders and the appropriate organizations, credit rating agencies downgraded 
Greece's debt rating. Standard and Poor's (S&P) has recently downgraded Greek's debt 
to "selective default," from its previous CCC rating, and Fitch and Moody's have cut 
Greek debt to "junk" status amid fears of a default by the Greek government.  
 What continues to worry the markets, however, is a fear of a Greek "disorderly 
default" and the domino effect that may occur within the Eurozone.2 Europe's banks 
alone, not including Greece or the European Central Bank (ECB), hold an estimated 27 
percent of Greek debt at a face value of $100 to $120 billion,3 and a disorderly default 
will ensure that most of this debt will not be repaid to creditors. Even with Greece's 
recent debt forgiveness by its creditors, followed by the approval of a second bailout, 
together both of which have translated into a "partial default" on Greek debt, the 
argument of this paper still holds true based on the likely unsustainability of Greece's 
current government deficits.  
 Major Eurozone governments have also been criticized for a lack of political 
leadership, and there have been signs of divisions within the European Central Bank. 
                                                          
1
 Hewitt, Gavin. "Eurozone Approves Massive Greece Bail-out." BBC News. (2 May 2010). 3 October 
2011. 
 
2
 "Eurozone Crisis Explained." BBC News Business. (27 October 2011). 30 October 2011.  
 
3
 Source: "BIS Quarterly Review." Bank For International Settlements. (12 December 2011). 21 February 
2012. 
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The governments in Greece and Italy have seen major changes since the crisis began 
to worsen in 2011, with more technocratic leadership in place designed to tackle the 
financial crisis, and perhaps provide a greater sense of authority to handle the 
problems. One main concern among investors is that the Eurozone's political structures 
do not have the authority to deal with the magnitude of the economic issues at hand.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Eurozone Crisis Explained." BBC News Business. (27 October 2011). 30 October 2011. 
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Chapter 2: Currency Unions, the Eurozone, and the Importance of 
Fiscal Policy 
 
 
2.1 - Currency Unions in Theory 
 There is a vast amount of literature on what economists, political scientists, 
bankers, politicians, and various experts believe to be the merits and disadvantages of 
currency unions in general, as well as heated discussion of particular historical 
examples. Chown notes that nearly all who contribute to the study of optimal currency 
areas refer back to Robert Mundell's classic article, "A Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas."5 
 A currency union is an agreement among members of that union who share a 
common currency without necessarily being required to further integrate their individual 
economic and financial institutions into the organization as a whole. Typically, in 
addition to a customs union, a single monetary and foreign exchange policy is used, 
and a country with a currency board accepts the monetary policy of the union's 
organization without expecting to have any influence on it.6 Cohen elaborates further, 
noting that monetary union means "the complete abandonment of separate national 
currencies, and full centralization of monetary authority in a single joint institution."7 The 
European Central Bank plays the role of centralized monetary authority in the European 
Union.  
                                                          
5
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 23. 
*The referenced article is: Mundell, Robert A. "Theory of Optimal Currency Areas." The American 
Economic Review, 51.4. (1961): 657-665. 
 
6
 Rosa, Samuele. Ed. "Definition of Currency Union." IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics. 
(May 2004). 03 December 2011. p. 2. 
 
7
 Cohen, Benjamin J. "Monetary Unions." Economic History Association Encyclopedia. (01 February 
2010). 02 December 2011. 
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 Currency unions fall into one of three types. The first and most simple is "the 
informal union;" a unilateral adoption of foreign currency by member nations for use in 
all member nations participating in the currency union. In the second approach, "the 
formal union," participating member nations sign a bilateral or multilateral agreement to 
adopt a foreign currency for use in each of their nations. The difference between formal 
and informal unions is that in the latter, foreign currency is used simultaneously with the 
member nation's currently issued domestic currency. The Eurozone is an example of 
the third currency union structure; "the formal union with common policy approach." It 
involves developing a common monetary policy among all member nations that includes 
forming an agreement for issuing a common currency for the entire union. This structure 
differs from the second approach that an entirely new currency is created for use 
amongst members, instead of using a currency type that already exists within the union. 
 A complicating factor in the Euro as an example of the formal union with common 
policy approach is the fact that some EU member nations continue to use their own 
national currency instead of the euro.8 These member nations' lack of adopting the euro 
as their sole national currency may prove to be detrimental to the Eurozone in the 
future, since the integration of monetary and fiscal policies of member nations have not 
been fully taken into consideration. 
 Currency unions have also been used as a form of regional currency 
reconstruction, and in some cases a motive for currency exchange. Chown notes that 
currency exchanges provide an opportunity for partial confiscation, or to check the 
activities of market operators, tax evaders, and monitor the deficit spending of 
                                                          
8
 The largest are the United Kingdom with the British pound, and Sweden with the kronor. 
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prospective member nations. In fact, these may be the primary motives behind creating 
or expanding a currency union.9 
 When determining which geographical regions should share a currency in order 
to maximize economic efficiency, a key concept in the debate is the theory of an optimal 
currency area (OCA). An OCA is a geographical region which would maximize 
economic efficiency, while also creating the conditions of trade openness and mobility 
that determine which regions within the union should share a common currency in 
general. Krugman argues that academic economists in general were more skeptical of 
the Eurozone project, and pointed toward the difficulties of monetary integration for such 
a diverse and large union. Furthermore, he notes that many arguments over the 
desirability of the euro stemmed from general disagreements "over whether or not 
European countries constituted an optimal currency area."10  
 Two significant roles of the central bank of a currency union are determining 
exchange rates and issuing currency. Rolnick et al. look at various difficulties in 
maintaining a currency zone. First, monetary unions are difficult to maintain because of 
what we identify as a seigniorage incentive problem. For example, if member nations 
within a currency union retain the individual ability to issue currency, then they also 
have the ability to utilize money creation in order to "collect seigniorage from residents 
of other countries."11 They also note that nations with money stocks growing faster than 
                                                          
9
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 30. 
 
10
 Krugman, Paul. "Paul Krugman and the Euro." Economic Policies for the 21st Century. (28 November 
2011). 04 December 2011. 
 
11
 Rolnick, Arthur J., Bruce D. Smith, and Warren E. Weber. "The Origins of the Monetary Union in the 
United States." The Cliometric Society: Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota. (2010). 04 December 2011. 
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average will collect seigniorage from residents in the other countries growing as a 
slower pace than average.  
 In the modern world, most of the world's currencies have a floating exchange 
rate, in which a currency's value fluctuates according to the foreign exchange market. 
However, some countries use a fixed exchange-rate system (also known as a pegged 
exchange-rate system), in which governments try to keep the value of their currencies 
constant against the value of another single currency, a grouping of other currencies, or 
another measure, such as gold.12 A few governments and currency unions use an 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM), which is based on the concept of fixed currency 
exchange-rate margins, but confines the variability of exchange rates through the upper 
and lower end of the margins. The goal of these mechanisms is to reduce exchange 
rate variability and achieve monetary stability. Prior to the introduction of the euro in 
1999, many European nations followed the European Exchange Rate Mechanism to 
ensure their own currency's stability.13  
 Chown argues that the adjustment process is the greatest challenge in 
maintaining a currency union. Arguments regarding fixed versus floating currencies, and 
how likely individual members will be subject to asymmetric shocks (given that the 
European Exchange Rate Adjustment Mechanism no longer exists), leads member 
nations and economists alike to question how effectively gold standard procedures as a 
pegged currency measure will work in the future.14 Chown also notes that a currency 
union offers more scope than a fixed exchange rate for a good adjustment mechanism, 
                                                          
12
 "Currency Exchange: Floating Rate vs. Fixed Rate." Investopedia. (12 March 2012). 18 April 2012. 
 
13
 "Exchange Rate Mechanism." Investopedia. (28 February 2012). 18 April 2012. 
 
14
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 24. 
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and that the commitment to a union expected to be permanent will encourage policies to 
converge by itself.15 However, once legal barriers and fiscal penalties are eliminated, 
transparency across borders will increase and open up travel to workers within the 
union. Many workers may be reluctant to work abroad, on the other hand, often 
because of the language or cultural barriers to entry in a foreign county.  
 Previous literature by Mundell discusses the problem and effect of differential 
preferences for inflation. Chown notes that although moderate inflation can be a source 
of seigniorage revenue and an alternative to taxation to a government, both inflation and 
taxation inflict additional costs on the private sector of the economy. These costs are 
typically higher than the yield of taxation.16 He further argues that a rational tax system 
"pushes each revenue-generating technique to the point at which the marginal costs to 
the economy per unit of revenue are equal," and that the trade-offs are different in 
various countries.17 However, the costs of a monetary union will be evident as some 
workers in a common monetary policy will be employed in less than optimal trade-off 
positions.18 
 
2.2 - Currency Unions in Practice 
 Few currency unions are permanent. Breakups of currency unions are almost as 
common as their establishments. This section examines two relevant and significant 
breakups. 
                                                          
15
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 24. 
 
16
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions, p. 25. 
 
17
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions, p. 25. 
 
18
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions, p. 25. 
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2.2.1 - The Latin Monetary Union of the 19th Century 
 The Latin Monetary Union of the 19th Century provides an example of a failed 
currency union that did not fully integrate member nation fiscal policies nor legally 
require member nations to abide by the Union's currency regulations. As the Napoleonic 
Wars came to a conclusion in the 1860s and due to the postwar chaos that followed, 
there was a need for monetary system reform within Europe. At this time, currencies 
were based on a metallic standard, and most circulating coins were made of gold and 
silver. Chown argues that had this standard been gold or silver, there would have been 
no problems, and countries would instead have exercised an exchange of foreign 
currency based on coins of identical weight and value.19 However, since the standard 
was bimetallic, the shortage of silver at the time created problems which led to the 
international community seeking a solution. Hence the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) was 
formed. 
 Founded in December 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland, 
members of the LMU agreed to change their national currencies to a standard of 4.5 
grams of silver per 0.290322 grams of gold, at a ratio of 15.5 to 1 respectively, and 
make the currencies freely interchangeable via uniform and universal coinage.20 The 
treaty came into effect in August 1866, and was quickly joined by the Papal States 
(predecessor to the Vatican) in the same year, followed by Greece and Bulgaria in 
1867. By 1889, Spain, Romania, Venezuela, Serbia, and San Marino had joined.21  The 
LMU established uniform standards for member nation coinages, and by making each 
                                                          
19
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 57. 
 
20
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions, p. 57. 
 
21
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions, p. 59. 
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nation's currency legal tender throughout the Union, it created a wider area for 
circulation of a common currency and coordinated the supply of specie coins to the 
great convenience of travelers and traders. Cohen notes that it also created a formal 
exchange rate, where authority over participating member nation's currencies remained 
under management of each separate government.22 
 The Union was regulated by stringent criteria within the treaty, and minting of 
coins corresponded to the reserves of gold and silver possessed by national banks. 
Issues arose when the administrator of the Papal Treasury began to increase its silver 
coinage without the prescribed amount of metal in them. This led to papal coins quickly 
becoming debased and widely circulated in other LMU nations, and the eventual 
ejection of the Papal States from the Union because they minted six times as many 
coins as they were allowed to.23 
 Himmelreich argues that the Union was set to fail because it never really worked, 
and eventually disintegrated over time. When faced with dilemmas between Union and 
national interests, they pursued national interests and avoided integration that reduced 
state sovereignty.24 Furthermore, there were little mechanisms of control in place, and 
the incompleteness of the treaty led to unilateral interpretations as each member nation 
utilized it for their own advantage. It is important to note that the treaty for the LMU does 
not mention paper-based banknotes, and left this issue to the discretion of individual 
                                                          
22
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 59. 
 
23
 "Latin Monetary Union." Encyclopedia Britannica. (2011). 08 December 2011. 
 
24
 Himmelreich, Johannes. "The Euro's Ailing Parents - Latin Monetary Union." Europe and Me Magazine. 
(2011). 08 December 2011. 
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banks.25 In the 1870s, new discoveries and better refining techniques increased the 
supply of silver, which led to the overvaluation of silver relative to gold on the fixed LMU 
exchange rate, and the eventual conversion to a pure gold standard in 1878. However, 
even though minting silver coins stopped, existing silver coins continued to remain in 
circulation, creating problems as the values of gold and silver fluctuated.26  
 The Union continued to shrink, and in 1908, Greece was ejected after it had been 
discovered that Greece was decreasing the amount of gold in the coins they were 
minting. World War One brought about significant political, economic turmoil, along with 
the destruction of much of Western Europe, eventually ending the LMU in practice. 
However, remnants of the LMU were evident for some years afterward as coins 
remained in circulation until the Union's official dissolution and end in 1927.27  
 The Latin Monetary Union collapsed in the end because it lacked a political 
union, evident in the cases of the Papal States and Greece knowingly breaking minting 
guidelines for coins, and subsequently being ejected from the union. The chance of 
creating a strong economic union was thus slim, as member nations did not integrate 
and change their political and economic policies. Moreover, they did not abide by the 
rules outlined in the original LMU treaty of 1865 to ensure success of the currency 
union. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Chown, John. A History of Monetary Unions. Routledge; New edition edition, 2003. p. 59. 
 
26
 "Latin Monetary Union." Encyclopedia Britannica. (2011). 08 December 2011. 
 
27
 "Latin Monetary Union." Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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2.2.2 - The Dollarization of Argentina 
 The case of Argentina in the 1990s illustrates a good example of a currency 
union that failed in the short term. Even though its currency board provided some 
financial stability via dollarization, it did not change national fiscal policies or encourage 
monetary discipline. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was one of the richest 
nations in the world, with its central bank full of gold. However, after years of huge 
budget deficits financed by loans abroad and Argentinean citizens, the nation was so 
debt-ridden that it could not secure new loans. Government leaders combated this issue 
by printing more money, which ultimately led to widespread inflation.  
  For years, hyperinflation had been extremely problematic for Argentina. At the 
beginning of 1975, the highest denomination for paper currency was 1,000 pesos, but 
by 1992, after the 1992 currency reform, inflation was so great that 1 peso was equal to 
100 billion pre-1983 pesos. In 1989 alone, Argentina's inflation was 5,000 percent.28 
However, the nation's inflation rates began to slow down after pegging its currency to 
the US dollar in 1998. De La Torre et al. note that the failure of Argentina to adequately 
address the currency-growth-debt trap at the end of the 1990s "precipitated a run on the 
currency and the banks, followed by the abandonment of the currency board and a 
sovereign debt default. The crisis can be best interpreted as a bad outcome of a high-
stakes strategy to overcome a weak currency problem."29  
                                                          
28
 "A History of Hyperinflation From Angola to Zimbabwe Via the USA." Bullion Vault: Gold Market 
Analysis & Investment Research. (16 October 2007). 15 December 2011. 
 
29
 De La Torre, Augusto et. al. "Living and Dying With Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's 
Currency Board." Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and 
Stability. Ed. Alexander, Volbert, Jacques Melitz, and George M. Von Furstenberg. Oxford University 
Press; First Edition, 2004. p. 183. 
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 Another problem that lead to the dollarization of Argentina is that historically, the 
nation has had a significant amount of currency fluctuations because of market 
speculation. Markets were extremely volatile in terms of their market reaction to 
announcements to government policies or information. Currency traders were subject to 
great scrutiny as the currency market and policy-makers were at the mercy of how the 
traders responded to day-to-day events. This was one reason why Argentina pegged its 
currency to the dollar; because it wanted financial security for the nation. 
 In the face of the Brazilian 1998 financial crisis and its decision to devalue the 
real, Argentina decided to swap its currency, the peso, for US dollars in order to insulate 
the country from economic hardship. In fact, the benefits and costs that a country faces 
by dollarizing are similar to those of euroization.30 By pegging a nation's currency to the 
dollar, it avoids the cost of exchanging the domestic currency for physical dollars, and 
eliminates the need to hedge foreign exchange risks. Furthermore, that nation 
experiences inflation rates similar to the United States as a result of commodity 
arbitrage, causing interest rates to fall near US levels. Salvatore explains that although 
dollarization eliminates the currency risk but not the country risk, it can still lead to 
reduction of country risk.31 
 To ensure financial stability, the goal of Argentina with its 1998 monetary union 
consisted of several components. First was to negotiate a treaty consisting of a 
monetary association with the US, and adopt the US dollar as its national currency. 
Next was to offer other nations across the Americas, primarily South and Latin America, 
                                                          
30
 Salvatore, Dominick. "Euroization, Dollarization, and the International Monetary System." Monetary 
Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability. Ed. Alexander, Volbert, 
Jacques Melitz, and George M. Von Furstenberg. Oxford University Press; First Edition, 2004. p. 33. 
 
31
 Salvatore, Dominick. "Euroization, Dollarization, and the International Monetary System." p. 23. 
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the opportunity to join the union, and create a pan-American currency union. Heads of 
state and those responsible for drafting the treaty for the currency union wanted all 
member nations to abide by strict fiscal discipline, similar to the criteria in the Maastricht 
Treaty for Europe's Economic and Monetary Union. Members of this currency union 
would then receive a share of income that the US Federal Reserve receives for printing 
US dollars, and be expected to open their markets nationwide to imports from dollar-
zone nations and negotiate better access to its products in the US market.32 However, 
even given the aggressive measures the Argentinean Central Bank wished to 
implement, and the regional benefits that would arise from the union, both the US and 
IMF denied their interest in becoming involved in the operations.33  
 Salvatore argues that by retaining its own currency alongside the dollar, 
Argentina was left vulnerable to exchange rate and financial crises that could arise out 
of fear of devaluation of the nation's peso against the dollar.34 These fears became 
reality as the financial crisis in South America began to deteriorate in fall 2001. Faced 
with the challenge of either devaluating its own currency or committing to full 
dollarization of the country, Argentina chose to slightly devalue the peso and then let it 
float fairly freely against the dollar. This proved to be detrimental to the peso's value, as 
it depreciated to approximately 3.0 pesos per dollar, and hovered there from 2002 to 
                                                          
32
 "Argentina Plans Monetary Union." BBC News Business: The Economy. (22 January 1999). 09 
December 2011. 
 
33
 "Argentina Plans Monetary Union." BBC News Business: The Economy. 
 
34
 Salvatore, Dominick. "Euroization, Dollarization, and the International Monetary System." Monetary 
Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability. Ed. Alexander, Volbert, 
Jacques Melitz, and George M. Von Furstenberg. Oxford University Press; First Edition, 2004. p. 33. 
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2008.35 The implications of the peso's devaluation and depreciation were significant; as 
bank deposits of pesos declined and dollars steadily increased, followed by a mass 
withdraw of deposits from national banks. By November 2001, 47 of the top 50 banks 
suffered significant withdraws of patron deposits.36 In January 2002, Adolfo Rodríguez 
Saá, the new Argentinean president, repealed the Convertibility Law, adopted a new 
provisional fixed exchange rate, and converted all bank accounts denominated in 
dollars into pesos. The peso swiftly depreciated by 75 percent of its value with respect 
to the US dollar months after its peg was abandoned.37 
 De la Torre et al. note that pegging its peso to the dollar was highly inconvenient 
because it ended up being devalued in the end, even though that was what Argentina 
was trying to avoid. In fact, Argentina was nowhere near meeting the conditions for an 
optimal currency area, and dollarization was chosen in-part as a response to 
hyperinflation in the 1980s and the following implosion of financial intermediation.38 
Argentine officials believed that dollarization would create a stable monetary union in 
South America, and steer the nation away from financial instability. Instead, it became 
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subject to various economic shocks the US experienced, as much of US foreign trade 
was with nations whose currencies change against the dollar.39 
 The case of Argentina provides a vivid example of why it is a poor decision to 
blindly peg one currency against another. Even though it was trying to stabilize its own 
currency and economy, Argentina failed to realize that it would be subject to the 
economic shocks that affect the US economy. The Argentinean people were fleeing the 
peso because it was unstable and was affected by the constantly changing investment 
conditions in the country. Dollarization ultimately did not work because Argentina did not 
change its monetary and fiscal policies. Instead, the peso needed to be devalued in 
order to stabilize the nation's economy, and reduce inflation. 
 
2.3 - The Euro, Eurozone, and the European Central Bank 
 Officially adopted on December 16, 1995, and first entering circulation on 
January 1, 2002, the euro is the official currency of the European Union. It was 
introduced as a noncash monetary unit in 1999 and by February 28, 2002, the euro 
became the sole currency of Eurozone member states, replacing the former European 
Currency Unit (ECU). Today the Eurozone consists of 17 of the 27 member nations of 
the EU.40 A study in 2007 placed the euro as the second largest reserve currency as 
well as the second most traded currency in the world after the United States (US) 
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dollar.41 However, as of 2009, the euro has surpassed the US dollar with the highest 
combined value of banknotes and coins in circulation in the world, with close to €890 
billion in circulation.42 
 The resulting single market that emerged from European Union treaties, 
including the creation of the Eurozone, has freed citizens from a wide array of 
restrictions, meaning that goods, services, and people can move freely throughout the 
EU. Furthermore, it has dismantled previous national frontiers between EU member 
nations, and opened up economic free trade and working opportunities, positively 
impacting the lives of the Europeans whom reside within its borders. Citizens of 
member nations now enjoy the freedom to travel, work and conduct business abroad, 
chose from a wide variety of goods and services, and enjoy full consumer rights and 
protection when shopping outside one's home country.43 Anti-competitive practices, 
such as markets being artificially inflated by companies across borders in order to 
maximize profit, are dealt with swiftly in order to protect consumers. For example, on 
June 27, 2007, the EU passed Roaming Regulation 717/2007. This legislation created a 
set of maximum prices for data usage and phone calls made and received while 
abroad.44  
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 Salvatore discusses some of the most significant benefits nations receive by 
joining the Eurozone, and notes that "the benefits are: 
1. The elimination of the need to exchange currencies across borders or for Euros; 
2. the elimination of excessive volatility of their currencies; 
3. more rapid economic and financial integration within the EU members; 
4. greater economic discipline; 
5. sharing the revenues from issuing more Euros in the future with other Eurozone 
members;  
6. elimination of national currencies and country financial risk, and, thus, a lower 
cost of borrowing in international financial markets; 
7. greater economic and political importance."45 
As a result of not being forced to convert currencies upon entering a new European 
country, both consumers and businesses are able to make significant savings in the 
cost of transactions within the Eurozone. This is due to the single-currency model the 
Eurozone follows, which is in turn leading to the development of markets within Europe, 
especially the poorer regions. The European Commission (EC) notes that the 
achievement of the Eurozone and the EU is not just economic; it has helped EU 
member states become citizens of Europe without losing any of their national 
characteristics or cultural traditions.46 
  Established by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998, the European Central Bank 
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(ECB) is the institution of the EU that is responsible for the monetary system of the 17 
Eurozone member nations and the euro currency. The ECB works with the other 
national banks of each Eurozone member "to formulate monetary policy that helps 
maintain price stability in the European Union."47 The primary responsibilities of the 
ECB are to formulate monetary policy, conduct foreign exchange, hold currency 
reserves, authorize the issuance of bank notes, and promote the smooth operation of 
the financial market infrastructure for securities in Europe.48 Furthermore, the ECB is to 
"ensure the smooth running of the Economic and Monetary Union by managing the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB).49 Its primary objective is the maintain price 
stability by defining the monetary policy of the Union."50  
 In its structure, purpose, and legal constraints, the ECB is a unique financial 
institution containing some important features of central banking, but lacks others. The 
ECB was created to be the central institution of a monetary union, and remains today 
the governing core of the Eurozone. Only the ECB is authorized to issue bank notes in 
the Eurozone. While member nations may issue lower-denominational coins, the ECB 
must first authorize the specific quantity of coins to be issued. It is also responsible for 
opening accounts with financial institutions that wish to conduct business with the ECB 
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or national central banks.51 The ECB plays an important regulatory role in the financial 
system primarily through imposing requirements for credit institutions established in 
Member States to hold minimum account reserves with the ECB or the national central 
banks, and create regulations for efficient payment systems.52 The ECB is also in 
charge of monetary policy, which is conducted primarily through open market borrowing 
or lending claims.53 
 The ECB is managed by three bodies: the Governing Council, the Executive 
Board, and the General Council. The Governing Council is the main decision-making 
body of the ECB, and consists of six members of the Executive Board, and the 
governors of the national central banks of the 17 euro area member nations.54 It is 
responsible for adopting the guidelines and decisions required in order to achieve the 
ECB's missions, primarily formulating monetary policy for the Eurozone, and can set 
interest rates at which commercial banks can obtain capital from their central bank. The 
Executive board is comprised of the President and Vice-President of the ECB, and four 
additional members appointed by the European Council. It implements monetary policy 
as defined by the Governing Council, manages daily operations of the ECB, and 
provides national central banks with day-to-day instructions.55 The General Council is 
comprised of the President and Vice-President of the ECB, and the central bank 
governors of all EU member nations, bringing together the central bank heads of 
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Eurozone and non-Eurozone members. It is considered to be a third decision-making 
body of the ECB, primarily responsible for collecting statistical information and 
producing activity reports, with the mission to contribute to the function of the ECB as a 
consultant.56  
 The European Central Bank's independence of other European Union institutions 
is conducive to maintaining price stability, and both national governments and EU 
institutions are legally bound by treaties to respect the bank's independence. In 
particular, the ECB, national central banks, and members of decision-making bodies are 
not permitted to take any instructions from EU institutions, member nation governments, 
or their governing bodies.57 The European Central Bank notes that the bank's 
independence is a key structural component in the institutional framework for the single 
monetary policy, and is supported "by extensive theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence on central bank independence."58 In order to shield itself from further influence 
exercised by public officials, the ECB is prohibited from granting loans to EU bodies or 
national public sector entities. However, it does have all required components 
necessary to efficiently implement monetary policy, and is freely permitted to decide 
how and when to utilize these tools.59 It is important to note that the ECB is modeled 
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after the German Bundesbank, which traditionally has placed strong emphasis on low 
inflation and independence.60 
 Security of tenure for important positions within the bank provide key evidence of 
the ECB's independence, as the minimum term of office for a national central bank 
governor is five years, and executive board members have non-renewable eight-year 
terms. If serious misconduct is discovered, or the official is unable to successfully fulfill 
his or her duties, then both can be removed from office.61 In order to offer accountability 
to the public, the ECB is obligated to make available to the public reports on all 
activities, and must present these findings to the European Commission, European 
Parliament (EP), the European Council, and the Council of the European Union. In 
addition, the EP is permitted to question the findings, and then voice its opinion on 
candidates to the executive board.62 
 In recent years, the ECB's independence and distance from outside influence 
has been called into question. Since Sarkozy was sworn in as President of France in 
2007, he has made attempts to influence the ECB politically and has criticized the 
bank's policies on interest rates in order to promote growth and job creation within the 
EU. In 2008, he attempted to introduce a European rescue fund during the global 
financial crisis. 63 These actions have caused the bank's independence to come under 
widespread scrutiny and criticism. 
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2.4 - Fiscal Policy and its Importance in Eurozone Maintenance 
 In order to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Eurozone, the 27 member 
nations of the EU originally passed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), adopting it in 
1997. It is an agreement that consists of fiscal monitoring by members of the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers, and implementing sanctions against 
members who do not abide by it. Furthermore, member nations must respect EU and 
ECB recommendations to not have a budget deficit (which includes the sum of all public 
budgets, including municipalities, etc.) greater than 3 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP), and must have a national debt lower than 60 percent of GDP.64 These debt 
values were agreed upon in order to promote budgetary discipline of member nations 
and prevent economic instability in the Union. Currency values change daily (sometimes 
hourly). A government's national debt, budget deficit, and debt default rate all affect its 
nation's worldwide credit rating, making it either cheaper or more expensive to borrow 
new money. These components affect a currency's value accordingly, and should a 
member nation's debt level grow too large, the value and stability of the union will be 
negatively impacted. However, these values are not legally-binding. 
 In the face of the Greek debt crisis, skyrocketing deficit levels in the PIIGS 
(Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), and the possibility of a Greek default on its 
debt, the EU has modified its economic model and policymaking. Adopted in March 
2011 as the more stringent successor to the SGP and using the EU's open method of 
coordination, the Euro-Plus Pact (EPP) created concrete commitments in which the 
member nations of the EU are forced to abide to a list of fiscal and political reforms 
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intended to enhance their fiscal strength, discipline, and competitiveness.65 This 
renewed effort for stronger economic policy coordination for competitiveness and 
convergences consists of four main strategic goals: fostering competitiveness, fostering 
employment, contributing to the sustainability of public finances, and reinforcing 
financial stability.66 Recently, an additional fifth issue was added in order to successfully 
coordinate tax policy, which addresses all member nations of the pact.67   
 Fiscal policy is defined as "government spending policies that influence 
macroeconomic conditions," such as tax rates, budgets, and government spending, in 
an effort to control the economy and limit public expenditures.68 Trying to integrate an 
individual Eurozone member nation's fiscal policies was, and still is, a very sensitive 
subject area because it reduces national sovereignty. Fiscal coordination within the EU 
lies within broad guidelines which are written by each member nation, but relate 
primarily to the 17 current Eurozone members. However, these guidelines are not 
legally binding, as there is a great deal of opposition towards integration of Eurozone 
fiscal policies. Nations in general prefer to exercise individual control over what their 
expenses are and will be. Members are requested to respect the limits set by the 
Stability and Growth Pact for national debt and deficit ratios, and are threatened with 
fines should any exceed the limit.  
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 Fiscal policy in the EU consists of three macroeconomic issues which focus 
primarily on identifying an existing problem, stabilizing the problem, and then 
coordinating the solution to the problem.69 It has played an important role in the survival 
of the Eurozone, as the burden of weaker nations, such as Greece, is transferred to 
wealthier members, and prevents a government default on its debt.  
 On December 9, 2011, all EU members, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, agreed to strict caps on government spending and borrowing under the new 
European Fiscal Union.70 This new treaty was proposed in order to promote increased 
fiscal integration of EU member nations, and prevent contagion from the current Greek 
debt crisis and any debt crisis in the future. States that agree to the treaty will have to 
concede some of their fiscal sovereignty, as it focuses on convergence of tax policies, 
welfare systems, and labor market regulations.71 Unfortunately for the Eurozone, the 
contagion effects have continued to spread, as the S&P downgraded the credit ratings 
of nine European countries on January 13, 2012. France and Austria saw their AAA 
credit ratings reduced one notch to AA+, whereas Spain and Italy had their ratings 
reduced by two notches. Portugal and Cyprus' debt ratings were both cut to "junk" 
status.72 
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 On the other hand, monetary policy, which is the actions of a central bank, 
currency board, or other regulatory committee that determine interest rates, exchange 
rates, and size and rate of growth of the money supply, is much more readily agreed 
upon, and receives less opposition by dissidents and politicians in the long-term.73 In 
order to influence the Greek debt crisis, the ECB changed its monetary policy by 
readjusting collateral requirements to ensure that the Greek public remained eligible to 
take out loans. On May 3, 2010 the ECB suspended its minimal credit rating threshold 
for collateral eligibility, and by May 10, it announced measures to address severe 
tensions in certain market segments.74  
 The approval of the Euro-Plus Pact made integrated fiscal policy within the 
Eurozone a recommendation and not a requirement. The lack of authority in the Stability 
and Growth Pact led several member nations to stray from the minimum debt 
recommendations and fall into economic turmoil. Krugman argues that several countries 
did not follow the Maastricht Treaty norms because they found compliance with them 
difficult over the duration of the euro's adoption as a common currency.75 A key concept 
of this argument was the notion that maintaining an optimal currency zone, even though 
it increases trade openness and mobility, was difficult because of the requirements to 
become a member, even though the PIIGS, with the exception of Greece, were very 
good at meeting the targeted requirements. 
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 Currently, the PIIGS are suffering from high government deficits, continued 
economic decline, and have had their debt ratings downgraded by various credit rating 
institutions. Banks within wealthier Eurozone member nations, such as Germany and 
France, hold PIIGS bond debt, notably Greece's, and have had their central banks' 
credit ratings downgraded because of their exposure to it. 
 Moreover, major Eurozone governments have been criticized for a lack of 
political leadership, and there have been signs of divisions within the European Central 
Bank (ECB). One main concern in the markets is that the Eurozone's political structures 
do not have the authority to deal with the magnitude of the economic problems at 
hand.76 
 Recently, there have been notable shifts in government because of fiscal policy 
disagreements, and the Greek and euro debt crises (GDC and EDC, respectively). The 
Prime ministers of Greece and Italy, and their respective political parties have resigned 
from government because of the dissent created by the EDC. The political impact in 
Greece was significant, as Greek parliament called for a vote of confidence on 
Papandreou's political party shortly after he announced a Greek referendum regarding 
bailout funds to be voted on in November 2011 (later postponed to January 2012, and 
then scrapped altogether). Moreover, the November elections in Spain were swayed 
because of Spain's debt levels, and how the EDC has affected the nation as a whole. 
Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy's governments (Germany and France, 
respectively) may be up for a vote of confidence in the near future. In fact, Paul 
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Krugman argues that Eurozone governments are beginning to lean towards the left 
because of the "right-wingers who so ardently supported the euro project."77 
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Chapter 3: "Story" of the Greek Debt Crisis 
 
 
3.1 - Events Leading Up to the Crisis 
 On January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth nation to join the Eurozone, and 
accept the euro as its single currency. Former Greek Finance Minister, Yiannos 
Papantoniou, announced that by leaving its former currency, the drachma, Greece had 
entered an historic era "that would place Greece firmly at the heart of Europe."78 
However, even then some analysts feared that the euro's stability could suffer from the 
inclusion of weaker nations from Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean region.79  
 In order to qualify for euro membership, the Greek government was required to 
agree to adopt strict austerity measures, mainly through deep cuts in public spending. 
When the euro was introduced to world financial markets in 1999, Greece was left out of 
the Eurozone for failing to meet the EU's economic criteria, known as the Maastricht 
criteria. These criteria, similar to those of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for 
Eurozone member nations, include: inflation no greater than 1.5 percentage points 
above the average rate of the three best performing member nations of the EU, a 
national budget deficit at or below three percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 
national public debt not to exceed 60 percent of GDP, long-term interest rates no more 
than two percentage points above the rate in the three EU nations with the lowest 
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inflation over the previous year, and entry of the national currency into the euro 
exchange rate mechanism two years prior to Eurozone entry.80  
 For Greece, membership in the Eurozone meant that bond markets no longer 
needed to worry about high inflation or devaluation. In addition, it decreased the interest 
rates by which the government could refinance its debt since the nation was deemed 
more financially stable. The net interest costs to GDP fell by 6.5 percentage points, and 
the under-pricing of Greece's default risk provided it with easier access to longer-term 
borrowing. General spending increased significantly because of these lower interest 
rates, and Greece experienced strong GDP growth each year until the global financial 
crisis of 2008.81  
 In November 2004 (and again in November 2009 after elections), the 
government admitted it had provided false statistical information to gain entry into the 
Eurozone, on the basis that figures showed Greece's budget deficit to be much lower 
than it really was.82 Even though Eurozone member nations are expected to have 
deficits less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), revised data and Greek 
press reports suggested that the country's budget deficit in 1999 was actually 3.38 
percent.83 
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 The Greek government has a long history of problems with its public debt, 
spending more than half the years since its 1832 independence in default.84 There are 
several "deeply entrenched" features of the general Greek economy and Greek society 
that have inhibited sustained economic growth, while also creating conditions that 
underlie the existing crisis. The most important issues are Greece's significant state 
control of the economy, its large and very inefficient public administration, widespread 
tax evasion, and its political clientelism.85  
 By March 2005, the cost of hosting the 2004 Olympics, estimated at $15 billion 
and said to be paid for mostly by the state, had begun to affect Greece's financial 
stability.86 Furthermore, even though Greece was in noticeable financial trouble, the 
Greek government continued to spend more on general benefits for its citizens, while 
receiving less money in taxes to cover these expenses. Public spending as a whole, 
and public sector wages and benefits were at an all-time high, and much greater than 
most other Eurozone and EU member nations. As recently as 2009, "Greek government 
expenditures accounted for 50 percent of GDP, with 75 percent of non-interest public 
spending going to public sector wages and social benefits."87 However, according to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while spending on 
public administration in Greece was the highest as a percentage of total public 
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expenditures, there has been "no evidence that the quantity or quality of the services 
are superior."88 In order to offset its growing debt problem, the new Greek government 
attempted to impose an austerity budget in order to decrease the country's deficit and 
"get public finances back on track."89 By spring 2006, the austerity measures were seen 
to as have worked after GDP was estimated to have increased by 4.1 percent.90  
 From 2000 until 2007, Greece had one of the fastest growing economies in the 
Eurozone, with GDP growing at an annual rate of 4.2 percent as foreign investment and 
capital entered the country. The Greek government was permitted to run large structural 
deficits as the economy became increasingly stronger, and bond yields fell.91 Its initial 
currency devaluation allowed it to help finance borrowing. Once Greece became a 
member of the Eurozone in 2001, it could borrow more due to the lower interest rates 
government bonds held. As recently as 1990, Greece held controlling stakes in 
approximately 75 percent of all business assets in the country, and tightly regulated 
other sectors of the economy, but by 2008, it had reduced its stake to about 50 
percent.92  
 It is important to note that public finances during this period were strained further 
with the influx of low interest rate capital, and were only exacerbated by the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. Furthermore, this increase in capital did not result in any 
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significant fundamental changes in how the Greek economy was managed, nor did it 
affect investments that would increase the competitiveness of the economy. Instead, the 
government took advantage of its increased access to cheap credit and used it to offset 
the country's low tax revenues, pay for government spending (which was already the 
highest in the EU), and pay for imports that were not offset by tariffs or exports 
overseas.93 
 The initial austerity measures implemented to reduce Greek debt were ultimately 
unsustainable over time. Interest rates on loans increased significantly, and tax evasion 
remained at high levels. The general public began to hold public demonstrations against 
the austerity measures, and they focused specifically on the cutting of public sector pay 
and pensions, the reduction of benefits, and the increase of taxes. Over time, it became 
too expensive to borrow commercially because of the high interest rates being charged.  
 By 2009, economic recovery was seen as short-lived, as the 2008 global 
financial crisis hit with full force, affecting nations worldwide. Greek tourism and 
shipping, two of its largest industries, were both severely impacted and revenues sank 
15 percent in 2009.94 Moreover, government budget and trade deficits grew 
dramatically, and borrowed funds were not placed in income-producing investments that 
"would generate future growth, increase the competitiveness of the economy, and 
                                                          
93
 Nelson, Rebecca M. et. al. "Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications." p. 3. 
 
94
 Samaras, Harris A. "Greece Unlikely To Escape Its Worst Financial Crisis of Modern Times!" Pytheas 
Market Focus. (July 2009). 12 November 2011. p. 2. 
 
35 
 
create new resources with which to repay the debt."95 Greece's national debt increased 
from $228.5 billion in 2004 to $356 billion in November 2009. To make matters worse, 
the government of former Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou revised its 2009 budget 
deficit estimate to 12.7 percent of GDP, more than twice the previous estimate of 6 
percent.96  
 Following these revisions, credit rating agency Fitch downgraded Greek debt 
from A- to BBB+, below investment grade for the first time in a decade.97 The fallout that 
followed the downgrade was severe, as financial markets around the globe sold off, 
causing the European stock market to tumble and the euro to weaken amid investor 
worries. Smith notes that "European stock markets also took fright, with the pan-
European FTSEurofirst index slipping 1.5 percent, while in London the FTSE 100 shed 
1.65 percent to close at 5223.13, down 87.53 points on the day. The euro fell by 2 
percent against the yen and by 0.6 percent against the dollar to $1.472."98 
  Since the Eurozone began to face a major debt crisis in early 2010, Greece has 
been the center of attention. With an estimated 2011 debt to GDP value of 161.8, it now 
has the highest level of public debt in the Eurozone, with one of the largest budget 
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deficits, estimated to be approximately $482.7 billion.99 However, its budget deficit as a 
percentage of GDP has begun to decrease in recent years, from 15.8 percent in 2009, 
to 10.6 percent in 2010, and in 2011, as forecasted by Greek Finance Minister 
Evangelos Venizelos, the country's deficit fell to approximately 9 percent of GDP.100 
Nelson et. al. mentions that Greece was the first Eurozone member to come under 
intense market pressures, and also the first to look at other Eurozone member nations 
and the IMF for financial assistance.  
 Fears of a sovereign debt crisis began to develop among investors concerning 
Greece's ability to meet its debt obligations in late 2009, when Papandreou revised 
Greece's 2009 budget deficit  estimate to over twice what it had been previously thought 
to be, and announced a significant increase in government debt levels. The economic 
downturn stemming from the global financial crisis had negatively affected public 
finances as government spending on public programs, such as unemployment benefits 
and pensions, increased, while tax revenues decreased.101 Greece's reported general 
government gross debt rose from 106.1 percent of GDP in 2006 to 129.3 percent of 
GDP in 2009, and then to 144.9 percent of GDP in 2010.102 Although a disorderly 
default on Greek debt was rumored to be in the near future, Eurozone, European, and 
EU leaders, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the ECB all agreed that a 
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default would be extremely risky, and must be avoided at all costs. Even though Greece 
accounts for only 2.5 percent of the Eurozone economy, a default by Greece could 
ignite a major global sell-off of other Eurozone members with high debt levels as 
investors lose faith in other Eurozone countries. The result would leave major European 
banks that were exposed to Greek debt and other risky investments in Eurozone 
countries unable to rebound from such a significant loss on those investments, and may 
in turn require a bailout from other financial institutions. 
 
3.2 - Early Attempts to Solve the Greek Debt Crisis 
 Nelson et. al. note that "over the past year, the IMF, European officials, the 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the Greek government have undertaken substantial 
crisis response measures" in order to avoid the fear of contagion and financial turmoil a 
Greek default would generate.103 In January 2010, Greece announced an aggressive 
stability program that will seek to cut its deficit to 2.8 percent of GDP by 2012, and since 
then, Greece has adopted a number of austerity packages. On February 9, 2010, the 
first austerity package was implemented with the signing of memorandums with the IMF 
and ECB concerning potential bailout loans, should they be necessary. This package 
included a salary freeze of all government employees, a reduction of bonuses by 10 
percent, a cut in overtime pay by 30 percent, and cuts in the number of public 
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employees, and work-related travel compensation. However, public sector pensioners 
who earn less than $2,700 per month will be granted an increase of 1.5 percent.104  
 In March 2010, Greek civil servants were asked to accept lower bonuses and 
higher taxes, or the country could risk defaulting on its debt and falling into bankruptcy. 
Amid these fears, Greece's parliament passed a second austerity package on March 5; 
the "Economic Protection Bill." This package was expected to save another $6.5 billion 
and offset budgetary measures proposed by the government.105 It focused primarily on 
spending cuts and tax increases, and included a 30 percent cut in Christmas, Easter, 
and leave of absence bonuses, an additional 12 percent cut in public bonuses, a 7 
percent cut in public and private employee salaries, an increase in value added tax 
(VAT) from 4.5 percent to 5 percent, 9 percent to 10 percent, and 19 percent to 21 
percent, an excise tax increase by 15 percent on fuel, 65 percent tax increase on 
cigarettes, and an increase of 10 percent to 30 percent in taxes on imported cars.106 
This second plan sparked a fresh wave of protests and strikes against the government, 
primarily from labor unions who had initially kept quiet after the first austerity measures 
had been implemented. On March 11, street clashes broke out between police and 
youths in central Athens as riots and anarchy spread throughout the capital.107 
 By April 11, Eurozone finance ministers approved a $40.5 billion bailout package 
for Greece. While the Greek government initially rejected the notion of additional 
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bailouts, a few days later Greece's parliament admitted its need of help from the IMF, 
and estimated its bailout needs to be $60.7 billion instead. On April 23, the EU and IMF 
approved the requested bailout package, with the first installment of $11.5 billion to 
cover Greek bond debt, and requested that the Greek government agree to implement 
further austerity measures. Four days later, Greece's debt rating was downgraded to 
BB+, also known as "junk" status, by the S&P amid fears of default by the Greek 
government. The markets were unforgiving, as the FTSE 100 index dropped by 2.6 
percent.108 
 The negative reaction by credit rating agencies, global financial markets, and the 
Greek population to the second set of austerity measures and subsequent EU/IMF 
bailout generated increased concern of a Greek default, and many began to question 
the long-term consequences it may have on the stability of the Eurozone. On May 2, 
after talks between the Greek government and the EU and IMF, all parties agreed to a 
$148.4 billion rescue package to be paid out over a span of three years, and submitted 
the bill Parliament on May 4. Former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou 
described this new round of austerity measures as "unprecedented," as it would save 
an estimated $50.7 billion through 2012 and represent the largest government overhaul 
in a generation.109   
 These new measures addressed issues in pay cuts, pensions, implemented tax 
reform, and promoted privatization of companies. They significantly cut expenditures in 
Greece's public sector, including an 8 percent cut on public sector allowances, a limit or 
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elimination of bi-annual bonuses, freezes and cuts in public sector employee salaries, 
return of a new special tax on high pensions, increased taxes imposed on company 
profits, increase in property taxes, another increase in value added taxes, a reduction in 
publically-owned companies, a decrease in municipalities by 60 percent, and increased 
the retirement age from 61 to 65 for workers in the public sector (amongst many other 
reforms).110 However, the agreement was followed with a 48 hour general strike, and 
massive nation-wide protests that left three bank employees dead after it was 
firebombed by protesters during business hours.  
 In order to prevent financial crises similar to Greece's, global policymakers 
installed an emergency financial safety net fund worth $1 trillion on May 10, 2010. The 
purpose of the safety net was to "bolster financial markets and shore up the euro 
against contagion from the Greek crisis."111 The idea of Greece's sovereign debt crisis 
infecting other weaker Southern economies generated fear amongst European nations, 
many of which held a significant amount of their government bonds. The purpose of the 
financial safety net was to signal to the markets that the EU has the ability to, and will 
cover its member-nations' debts.112 
 Greece received its first loan of $19.3 billion from the EU on May 18 in order to 
repay its immediate debt. By July 7, Greek Parliament passed further pension reform 
measures, cutting benefits and raising the national retirement age from 60 to 65. Even 
in the wake of the increasing number of austerity measures and national reformations, 
                                                          
110
 "Greece's Austerity Measures." BBC News - Business. (05 May 2010). 15 November 2011. 
 
111
 "Timeline of a Crisis: How Greece's Tragedy Unfolded." The Telegraph. (16 June 2011).12 October 
2011. 
 
112
 Schmidt, Vivien A. "The European Union's Eurozone Crisis and What (not) to Do About It." Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 32.1 (2010): 199. 
 
41 
 
six months later, Greek debt downgrades continued, as Fitch became the third credit 
rating agency to cut Greek debt to "junk" status, after S&P and Moody's. This 
downgrade followed an EU-IMF finding which called for further measures by Greece to 
reduce debt and cut spending.113  
 By mid 2011, as worries of a Greek default grew, former Greek Finance Minister 
George Papaconstantinou, along with additional EU, IMF, Greek, and world leaders, 
determined that a debt restructuring was not in their best interests. Instead, they 
recommended that Greece continue with budget cuts and privatizations in order to 
overcome its debt and financial problems. On May 23, 2011, Greece announced a plan 
consisting of a series of privatizations in order to partially fund the $67.7 billion needed 
by 2015 to pay off some of the nation's debt. By June 8, Greece agreed to implement 
additional austerity measures and increase savings up to 2015 to cut deficits and 
continue to receive financial aid.114 Some of the new measures included: an increase in 
taxes for anyone with an income greater than $11,000, an extra tax for annual incomes 
greater than $16,000, a new 2 percent tax levied to combat unemployment, an increase 
in taxes for pensioners, and an increase in VAT in the housing industry.115  
 World markets reacted unfavorably to the new austerity measures, and on June 
13, Greece received the lowest credit rating in the world after S&P downgraded Greek 
debt from B to CCC. Papandreou responded by removing Papaconstantinou and 
reshuffling his cabinet, appointing party rival Evangelos Venizelos as finance minister. 
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The new cabinet received a vote of confidence shortly afterward, and by June 29, 
Papandreou won parliamentary majority in favor of the proposed five-year austerity 
plan, which increased access to new funding.116 
 In order to help Greece pay debts due for the month of July, the IMF disbursed 
$4.3 billion of the bailout funds on July 8. This was followed by an agreement on July 21 
by Eurozone leaders that Greece was in need of a second bailout package of $145.3 
billion, plus a $66.7 billion contribution by private sector bondholders by mid-2014.117 
From August through October 2011, Greece continued to adopt more austerity 
measures, including cutting high pensions by 20 percent (9/21) and passing a new and 
unpopular property tax (9/27), which were met with public sector worker strikes and 
violent protests. However, on October 2 Greece's government predicted a new national 
deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP, short of the previous goal set in 2010.118 
 On October 27, Eurozone leaders announced they had reached a deal with 
private banks and insurers in which they would accept a 50 percent loss on all Greek 
government bonds held by the respective institutions, a loss of over $133.5 billion.119 
Four days later, Papandreou called for a referendum on the second proposed bailout 
without consulting European leaders. While he won the support of his cabinet in backing 
the referendum, now set at $173.3, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel informed him on November 2 that Greece will not receive any 
more aid until Greek Parliament votes and agrees to its commitments to the 
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Eurozone.120 Furthermore, the referendum vote was postponed to be set in January 
2012, creating unrest amongst global financial markets, and called into question the 
confidence Parliament had in the existing government. After additional pressure from 
European leaders, Greece's government announced it had dropped the referendum 
plans, followed by a parliamentary vote of confidence, which Papandreou barely 
survived. He instead recommended that Greece form a coalition to prevent a Greek 
default, and by November 6, he solidified a deal with the opposition to approve the 
second bailout before the next round of elections, and that he would step down from his 
role as Prime Minister.121 
 As promised, Papandreou resigned on November 9, and the next day the new 
government was accepted and sworn in. Even though the New Democracy (ND) party 
continued to openly reject new austerity measures in return for austerity to be 
accompanies with measures for economic growth, the Grand coalition government of 
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), New Democracy, and the Popular 
Orthodox Rally (also known as LAOS; a small party with rather extreme rightwing 
views), won a vote of confidence on November 16, setting up foundation for a second 
Greek bailout.122  
 In the wake of the looming Greek debt crisis, on December 9, 2011, all EU 
members, with the exception of the United Kingdom, agreed to strict caps on 
government spending and borrowing under the new European Fiscal Union in order to 
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promote increased EU member nation fiscal integration, and prevent the contagion from 
Greece and any debt crisis in the future.123  However, by December 14, the IMF 
announced that Greece's reforms were running behind schedule in most areas, delaying 
its recovery.  
 Greece reached a tentative deal with its private creditors on January 28, 2012 to 
write off a substantial portion of its debt. However, Germany presented the most 
resistance to the talks, arguing that Greece must instead continue to implement more 
austerity cuts before additional loans could be disbursed.124 Two weeks later, on 
February 9 after repeated delays, leaders from the EU, IMF, and the three 
parliamentary Greek coalition parties met again to further discuss how to alleviate the 
worsening crisis. In exchange for new loans and rescue funds, Greece was required to 
cut 22 percent off the minimum wage, 15 percent off pensions, and to cut 15,000 public 
sector jobs. Inman notes that unemployment in Greece at this time had risen to an all-
time high of 21 percent even though significant austerity measures were already in 
place.125 
 The early February talks were successful, and on February 21, Eurozone 
member nations agreed to provide Greece with a second bailout package of $170 
billion. This recent bailout is expected to bring government debt down to 120.5 percent 
of GDP by 2020 and will launch a bond swap with private investors to help reduce and 
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restructure Greece's debts.126 However, S&P declared Greece in "selective default" on 
February 28 after banks agreed to write off more than half of their holdings of Greek 
debt.127 
 On March 9, Greece secured a much-needed private-sector backing for this debt 
swap, with 85.8 percent of bondholders agreeing to take heavy losses on their 
investments. Financial institutions were expected to write off approximately $130 billion 
of debt as banks and insurers will swap current bonds for longer-dated securities that 
pay a lower coupon.128 Private sector holders of Greek debt were expected to write off 
losses of 53.5 percent on the nominal value of their bonds, equating to a 75 percent 
loss on the net present value (NPV) of the bonds as part of the debt exchange. This 
private creditor bond exchange was completed on March 12 for a value of $141.4 
billion.129  
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
 
4.1 - Effect of the Greek Debt Crisis on the Euro 
 The value of the euro has depreciated against other international currencies 
since the Greek debt crisis emerged in 2009. As a result, many have expressed their 
fears that the current debt crisis in Europe will put the future of the Eurozone at risk. The 
spread of contagion stemming from the Greek debt crisis has led to many nations 
invested in Greek bond debt to see their credit ratings reduced by S&P and other rating 
agencies, beginning with the PIIGS, and recently spreading to more stable nations, 
such as France.130 As nations continue to expose themselves to Greek bond debt, and 
the debt of other nations at risk of a future default, we can expect credit rating agencies 
to continue to downgrade the credit ratings of countries and banking institutions 
worldwide.  
 Over the last few years, the value of the euro has fallen when compared to the 
United States (US) dollar. The fear of contagion brought forth by the Greek debt crisis, 
and the continued downgrades of Eurozone member nation credit ratings, have sent the 
value of the euro plummeting. Figure 1 below provides a graph of the exchange rate 
history of the euro compared to U.S. dollars since the euro's introduction in January 
2002 to April 2012. The values are the averages of daily figures for bidding rates in New 
York City. The monetary units are in euros to one U.S. dollar. 
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Figure 1  
Euro to U.S. Dollar Foreign Exchange Rate 
 
SOURCE:  "Euro / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
(16 April 2012). 16 April 2012.  
  
 
 The data shows that since fears of a European sovereign debt crisis began to 
emerge in late 2009, the value of the euro relative to the US dollar has never risen to 
pre-crisis levels. The euro sank to a 5-year low when the Greek government first 
requested in 2010 that an EU/IMF bailout package be activated, and sunk even further 
following the downgrading of its debt to junk status by S&P amid fears of a disorderly 
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default. Even though the value of the euro is greater than when it first emerged in 2002, 
the amount by which it has fallen in recent years is significant and provides evidence 
that the Eurozone's stability may be faltering; an effect of the crisis. 
 Following the May 2, 2010 approval by the Eurozone and IMF of a 110 billion 
euro bail-out package, and upon receipt of loans from the EU for Greece to repay its 
immediate debt, we see the value to the euro relative to the dollar gradually return 
closer to pre-crisis levels. Since the spring of 2011, as the possibility of a Greek default 
on debt became more realistic, the euro continued to drop, and is expected to do so 
unless drastic measures are taken to prevent a total default from occurring. Figure 2 
below provides a graph comparing Greece and Germany's government bond interest 
rates for the past three years. The values are the closing rates of daily figures with 10-
year Greek and German government bonds acting as benchmarks. The units are in 
percentages.  
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 Should the euro continue to exist as a viable currency, regardless of whether 
Greece defaults or not, the tensions between lenders and borrowers will have to be 
overcome. There has been a significant amount of Greek debt that has been forgiven or 
written off by European financial institutions and Eurozone member nations alike, 
creating dissent toward nations responsible for causing this financial instability. In the 
immediate future, it will be extremely difficult and expensive for any of these heavily-
indebted nations, especially Greece and the other PIIGS, to borrow new capital from 
financial institutions.131 Banks and other financial institutions that are willing to lend 
money to debtor nations will most likely force borrowers to abide by increasingly severe 
and painful measures to ensure they do not post a loss on their investment.  
 
4.2 - A Look at the Attempted Solutions 
 The European Union and its member nations, the European Central Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and the other actors involved in addressing the Greek 
debt crisis have relied heavily on two types of solutions: bailouts and austerity 
measures. Since its first bailout package was approved in August of 2010, Greece has 
continued to move closer to default, even though it has received a substantial amount of 
financial aid. The austerity measures passed by Greek parliament have had little effect 
on its fiscal woes, and have instead only stirred-up anti-governmental tension amongst 
the Greek population.  
 The majority of Greece's bailout funds have been provided as a monetarist 
solution by the IMF and EU in order to prevent Greece from defaulting on its debt. 
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European leaders fear that a Eurozone member's default and exit from the Eurozone 
would be interpreted as a failure of not only the euro, but the EU as well. Thus, a 
member state defaulting on its loans has been determined by many Eurozone and ECB 
authorities to be an untenable outcome. It was thought that in the worst cases, the 
stronger member states (such as the France and Germany) would support the weaker 
ones.132 As the situation in Greece becomes more dire, it continues to receive additional 
funding, with each stage requiring additional austerity measures to curtail its excessive 
government spending.  
 Greece is also experiencing a decline in its relationship with public and private 
financial institutions that have lent Greece money, since many of these austerity 
measures include some component of debt forgiveness in exchange for implementing 
the required changes. Both types of solutions have only postponed the inevitable, as 
they are unsustainable over time. Furthermore, the continuous need of the Greek 
government for bailout referendums has increased uncertainty about whether Greece 
can deal with its debts. 
 Greece is not the only country to receive financial aid of this form from the IMF. 
In fact, it is quite typical for countries in danger of default, including those outside of 
Europe, to receive IMF bailout funds. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998, 
the IMF dwarfed all previous bailouts, providing South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
(amongst various other nations) with bailouts of $57 billion, $17 billion, and $43 billion, 
respectively.133 Greece, as a comparison, has received approximately $27 billion in 
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disbursements thus far from the IMF ($97.9 billion total when including those from the 
Euro-area).134 Table 1 below provides an estimated overview of disbursements made to 
Greece by the Euro-area and the IMF.  
 
Table 1 
Overview of disbursements made to Greece, in billions of dollars (as of December 2011). 
Tranche Disbursements Euro-area IMF Total 
1 May 2010 19.4 7.4 26.8 
2 September 2010 8.7 3.5 12.2 
3 Dec 2010 / Jan 2011 8.7 3.4 12.1 
4 March 2011 14.6 5.5 20.1 
5 July 2011 11.7 4.3 16.0 
6 December 2011 7.8 3.0 10.7 
Total 70.9 27.0 97.9 
 
SOURCE:  "The Greek Loan Facility." Europa.eu: Economic and Financial Affairs. (31 December 2011). 
27 February 2012. 
 
 It is important to note that the bailouts and austerity measures have not been 
complete failures. The Greek debt crisis has increased the transparency of Greece's 
financial institutions and its government, and helped identify areas of wasteful spending. 
Low tax rates, high pensions, and low retirement ages have all since been modified to 
be more in-line with European norms and standards. Taxes, although still difficult to levy 
and collect in Greece, have been raised. Pension reform has decreased the amount of 
money pensioners receive, and increased the age required to be eligible to receive such 
funds.135 In fact, more than half of the money Greece has been loaned by the IMF and 
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EU member nations has gone to pay off the nation's bondholders, instead of funding 
Greece's overspending as some had feared.136 
 
4.3 - What Would Happen If Greece Defaulted? 
 Countries have repeatedly defaulted on their debts throughout history, including 
the United States.137 Most nations that suffer from acute insolvency issues are advised 
by lenders and regulators to restructure their national debt preemptively via an "orderly 
default." When a country defaults, its national debt is restructured, and in most cases, a 
significant portion of its debt is forgiven or written off by creditors. In fact, economists 
recommend this type of default as a solution to solve national debt crises because of its 
simplicity and minimal economic attrition. Orderly defaults are much less painless as far 
as defaults go, and it is common for lenders to forget about these debts very quickly, 
again providing loans within a few years to nations that recently defaulted.138 Prial 
argues that whether Greece will default or not seems moot at this point, and that it is 
already in the process of defaulting.139 However, if Greece does officially default on its 
debt, be it orderly or disorderly, there will be more of an impact on the Eurozone 
because of the multitude of regional implications.  
 The biggest fear of Greece defaulting on its debt is not the default itself, but the 
implications within the Eurozone and worldwide. Other Eurozone member nations facing 
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severe austerity measures and large debt repayments may look at Greece as an 
example of an alternative to paying off debt by choosing to stop all payments and go 
into default. In this scenario, countries exposed to the debts of other Eurozone member 
nations would see their debt ratings sink almost overnight, as the domino effect of 
multiple Eurozone member nation defaults spreads throughout the region. The value of 
the euro would plummet against international currencies and fear of a complete 
Eurozone collapse would plague international markets.  
 However, the Eurozone will be better off by allowing Greece to default by treating 
it as a learning experience, and identifying the root causes leading up to the crisis and 
how to prevent them in the future. Even though officials are afraid that the default of one 
Eurozone member nation may lead to significant implications for all other members, a 
total default may be in its best interests. It is important to note that EU member nations 
and private banking institutions are the primary holders of Greek bond debt. With 
Greece's partial default in March 2012, even though it is not evident now, those holding 
this debt may be sent into financial turmoil in at least the short-term. Table 2 below 
provides an estimated breakdown of Greek bond and debt holdings, not including its 
debts for bailout disbursements. Recently, European banks holding large amounts of 
Greek debt have had their credit ratings downgraded. The credit ratings of Societe 
Generale and Credit Agricole were both cut by Moody's in mid-September 2011 
because of their exposure to Greek debt.140  
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Table 2 
Estimated holders of Greek bonds and debt 
Country Amount Held (in billions of US $) Percentage Held 
Greek Banks   74.2 19.3% 
ECB (direct holdings, nominal value) 66.2 17.3% 
Central Bank of Greece 13.2 3.4% 
Greek Social securities/other government 39.7 10.3% 
France   56.9 14.8% 
Germany   26.8 7.0% 
United Kingdom   3.2 0.8% 
Italy   2.6 0.7% 
United States   1.8 0.5% 
Spain   0.6 0.2% 
Japan   0.5 0.1% 
Other Eurozone Countries 13.1 3.4%   
Other Investors   84.8 22.1% 
Total 383.6 100% 
SOURCE:  "BIS Quarterly Review." Bank For International Settlements. (12 December 2011). 21 February 
2012. 
 
 
 The previous cases of the 1998 dollarization of Argentina and the 19th century 
Latin Monetary Union show us that in order for currency unions to exist long-term, 
member nations must abide by the rules set forth in the original agreement of the union 
itself. Even if there are stringent regulations derived from a large-scale union with 
centralized banking institutions, it does not necessarily mean that member nations will 
abide by the guidelines. Member nations must be unanimous in agreement regarding 
minimum standards for new members to enter the union. They must also determine 
appropriate sanctions to be taken against those who stray from the minimum standards, 
and how to implement such measures. As we have seen in the exposure of others, 
currency union member nations need to integrate not only politically via a political union, 
but also economically with common fiscal and monetary policies.   
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 Greece is not alone in its need to change spending methods in order to ensure 
the situation does not grow worse. Other Eurozone member nations, especially newer 
members in Eastern Europe, are now required to make their financial records readily 
available to banking institutions and the EU in general. This increase in transparency 
has and will further improve the flow of information, and help identify which countries 
need to take further measures in order to prevent further financial system degradation, 
as well as avoid the contagion from Greece. Although several Eurozone member 
nations have not or currently do not abide by the financial guidelines required to be a 
member, the crisis has been slowed in part because of Greece's bailouts and austerity 
measures, and recent fiscal policy integration of all EU members under the new 
European Fiscal Union. 
 Analysts cannot yet place an exact figure on how much financial aid Greece, or 
even the rest of the Eurozone requires in order to remain stable. However, based on 
what nations such as Germany, who are exposed to Greek debt, are set to lose in the 
event of a Greek default, economically stronger Eurozone member nations will be better 
off financially if they help sooner rather than later. The exposure of French and German 
banks in particular to Greek debt could force these nations to bail out their own financial 
institutions more than in 2008 if Greece were to default. 
 When the Latin Monetary Union of 19th century Europe and the Eurozone of 
today are compared, we see several similarities; notably their lack of proper economic 
and fiscal integration. After the first LMU member nation was expelled from the union, in 
this case for not abiding by the guidelines for minting new coinage, we soon saw similar 
cases of other member nations expelled for similar transgressions. Although this was 
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not the sole reason for the dissolution of the LMU, one member nation leaving the 
union, followed by another, started a domino effect that ultimately played a significant 
role in the downfall and break-up of the LMU. European leaders seem to fear that if 
Greece leaves the Eurozone, it too will start a domino effect of weaker nations leaving 
the euro and lead to its demise. To combat the euro debt crisis, there have been tens of 
billions of euros (with hundreds of billions promised in the future) in the form of loans 
and bailouts pumped into several faltering Eurozone nations, much of it into Greece, in 
order to prevent a breakup from occurring.  
 If the Greek government fails to get its debt under control and defaults, it would 
set off a chain of events that, if not dealt with properly, would create substantial 
economic contagion with severe consequences. Sanati argues that a Greek default on 
its debt would lead to a complete lockup of the Greek economy, which could lead to a 
collapse and freeze of the Greek banking system, which holds billions of euros of Greek 
government bond debt.141 In addition, other banks worldwide would refuse to lend to 
Greek banks in order to limit their exposure to Greek debt, and the European Central 
Bank would cut off aid to Greece. The financial chaos that would ensue would trigger an 
estimated $5 billion in credit default swaps that investors in Greek bonds took out to 
protect themselves from a default. Sanati notes that the financial institutions that issued 
the credit default swaps "would need to pay the face value of the bonds immediately, 
putting a dent in their bottom line. Furthermore, foreign banks holding Greek 
government debt would need to write down or even write off the value of that debt given 
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the default."142 At this time, Greece is insolvent, and should the nation default, any 
remaining liquidity would dry up, if it has not already done so, and there would be no 
money remaining in Greece.143 
  Since Greece began passing austerity measures to control and reduce 
government spending, there has been a great amount of unrest amongst the Greek 
people. A disorderly default would lead to a drastic increase in general unrest as the 
Greek government would be unable to pay wages, pensions, or government-related 
expenses of any kind, causing the country to become impoverished. If Greece's banks 
are closed, and money unable to be withdrawn, its citizens will be unable to purchase 
basic necessities such as food, clothing, or water, which will lead to further unrest and 
ultimately large-scale riots.  
 In addition but equally detrimental, the ECB will now have bad debts that cannot 
be collected, which other European nations will have to make up for at greater cost. 
However, European banks located in Greece under strain from the impending financial 
situation will be able to survive on their own, so long as they are distanced far enough 
from Greece's debts. 
 We have already established that in order for the Eurozone to survive, member 
nations of greater economic strength, as well as the ECB, will need to invest in weaker 
member nations in order to ensure they do not default or leave the Eurozone because 
of financial distress, while also strengthening it as a whole. The ECB in particular is 
already providing greater financial assistance to struggling member nations, by making 
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money available to banks at low rates, but could arguably do more. What many of these 
stronger member nations have failed to fully realize, especially Germany, is that a 
Greek default will be more expensive for them in the long-term. Germany and its banks 
currently hold the second most Greek bond debt of any European nation at $26.8 billion, 
which equates to 7 percent of all debt held, or 26 percent of Greek bond debt held by 
Eurozone member nations (not including Greece or the ECB).144 German banking 
institutions, mainly non-quoted banks, would be one of the biggest potential losers from 
either a Greek default, or even forgiveness of a portion of Greek debt because of their 
total exposure to peripheral nations in the Eurozone that are tied to Greece through 
their lending to Greek banks.145  
 The financial implications of Greece further defaulting on its debt are not only 
substantial for Germany, but other holders of Greek debt. Individual nations, banks, 
pension funds, and other institutions exposed to Greece would lose most of their debt 
holdings, receiving pennies on the dollar, if anything at all. Private sector holders of 
Greek debt wrote off losses of 53.5 percent on the nominal value of their bonds, 
equating to a 75 percent loss on the net present value of the bonds as part of the debt 
swap on March 12. The loss thus far has been calculated to be valued at roughly 
$141.4 billion.146 On April 3, Fitch forecasted that at the end of 2012, Greek debt will 
total about $430 billion, compared to the estimated pre-swap total of about $468 billion. 
Official creditors, primarily governments, will hold approximately 75 percent of that debt, 
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compared to only 38 percent prior to the swap.147 As of the third quarter ended 2011, 
the total government debt of the European Union, consisting of all 27 member nations, 
was 10.32 trillion euros ($13.5 trillion). For the euro area, consisting of all 17 member 
nations, total government debt was 8.2 trillion euros ($10.76 trillion).148 While Greek 
debt only makes up 5.7 percent of the total Eurozone debt outstanding (3.5 percent of 
EU debt), there are many European nations and financial institutions invested in Greek 
debt, and further default will only worsen conditions for its creditors. The debt-swap in 
March paints a vivid picture of what these potential future losses may entail. 
 In the event of a further Greek default, the value of the euro would fluctuate and 
may drop significantly against international currencies as investors begin to lose 
confidence in the Eurozone as a currency union and the ECB as a central banking 
institution. Currency strategists have noted that the value of the euro versus the dollar 
would drop from current values to around $1.20 or less.149 Buying power for Eurozone 
member nations would decrease as well due to the euro being undervalued. However, a 
drop in the euro value may make European exports more competitive and increase 
exports. Ultimately, this drop may push Europe into another recession that could stretch 
to the US and even China.  
 Even though borrowing costs in Italy and Spain have been gradually decreasing 
in recent months, a Greek default would again cause these costs to rise as the fear of 
contagion spreads quickly throughout the region. Both Italy and Spain have large 
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economies with heavy debt loads, which has been responsible for additional concern 
amongst Eurozone member nations. Portugal, with its already high bond debt yield, 
would be the country next on the worldwide "default list." A Greek default would be 
especially detrimental to its money-holding citizens. If Greece were to leave the 
Eurozone, euros sitting in Greek banks would be converted to drachmas, and likely be 
devalued. 
 There are some similarities between the Greek debt crisis and the 1998 
dollarization of Argentina that may help forecast the implications in the event of a Greek 
default. Three years after Argentina pegged its currency to the US dollar in 1998, an 
economic crisis swept over the country. By late 2001, Argentina's suffocating debt load 
left it veering toward the biggest government default in history, as the nation's economic 
crisis boiled over into riots and looting. Brought on by this exponentially increasing debt 
load, Argentina's interim president Adolfo Rodriguez Sáa decided to suspend its debt 
payment to creditors. As goods, services, and cash became more of a rarity for average 
citizens, riots and poverty became rampant. Day-to-day transactions became 
increasingly more difficult to conduct without the infrastructure and financial means to 
do so. Similar to Greece, Argentina's government forced banking restrictions, raised 
taxes, and cut state worker salaries and pensions, but did not change its monetary and 
fiscal policies. In the end, in order to maintain national stability and prevent a default on 
debt, Argentina's currency was de-pegged, and no longer allowed to float freely against 
the US dollar. Soon afterward, the peso needed to be devalued in order to stabilize the 
nation's economy, and reduce inflation. This does not seem to be an option for Greece 
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because of possible contagion effects on other Eurozone countries -- an important 
difference from Argentina. 
 Ultimately, Argentina had no other choice but to default on its debt of $82 billion 
in 2001.150 We see similarities between the historical examples of the Latin Monetary 
Union of the 19th century, and the recent Argentinean financial crisis from a decade ago 
when compared to the Greek debt crisis of today. The impacts of the Argentine protests 
in 2001 following extremely unpopular IMF-sponsored austerity measures were 
problematic for its government, and in some instances, the country was essentially shut 
down. Riots and protests led to dozen of deaths, and the overthrow of former President 
Fernando de la Rúa. Argentina's presidential turnover increased during 2001 to 2003 to 
an all-time high, with three presidents serving in two years (four total in four years, 
including de la Rúa). Greece's history of unrest amongst its general population when 
austerity measures are passed leads one to infer that the response to similar 
instabilities will be anything but subtle. Instead, we will see the opposite, with 
widespread protests followed by riots. If an extended duration of this turmoil and 
government shutdown persists, then we can expect to see looting throughout the nation, 
which will in turn feed into political, and further economic, instability. This instability will 
be evident with widespread general strikes, a significant reduction in labor productivity, 
and other economic and political degradation.  
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4.4 - Potential Solutions and Outcomes to the Greek Debt Crisis  
 The outlook for Greece at this time is negative, with a limited number of possible 
outcomes. In one scenario, in which Greece realizes it cannot repay its loans on time, it 
informs foreign banks of the situation, and then restructures its debt. This seems to be 
the way that Greece is going thus far with the March debt swap. Thomson argues that 
most economic experts expect that a restructuring of Greece's debt is inevitable, and 
will force huge losses on primarily international and private banks. He further notes that 
these bank losses could require them to receive additional rounds of bailouts from 
European governments. If Greece undergoes a partial default, analysts expect at least 
60 percent to 80 percent of Greek debt to be forgiven by banks and financial 
institutions.151 
 The second option is that Greece defaults on its debt.152 A default would relieve 
Greece of the mountain of debt it cannot afford to pay off, currently estimated by Fitch to 
be at $430 billion by the end of 2012,153 no matter how many austerity measures it 
passes and jobs it cuts to reduce government spending. Greece's economy has already 
begun to shrink, and the longer the inevitable is prolonged, the worse off Greece's 
economy will be in the future. In fact, Greece defaulting is beginning to look like a better 
alternative than keeping it barely afloat. However, the fear of contagion is still 
widespread, and many are worried that a Greek default would create a domino effect of 
other nations following suit. The outcome, while not as severe as the 2008 financial 
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crisis, would still impact markets world-wide, with output contracting by 1.3 percent in 
2012.154  
 In the wake of a default, Greece would most likely take the opportunity to protect 
all Greek banks and depositors, and ensure that all Greek bank deposits, certificates of 
deposit, and pension payments are guaranteed. It is also assumed that Greece will 
continue to pay interest to its national banks on debts they currently hold. Sheetz 
argues that foreign banks and credit institutions would be the major losers in this 
situation, and lose most if not all, of their investment in Greek bond debt. Other financial 
institutions would become vulnerable as well, specifically the European, American, and 
Asian insurance companies that would have to pay out credit default swaps to investors 
who placed their bets against a Greek default. If they have to pay out these insurance 
claims, these financial institutions will then risk having low capital reserves, with 
bankruptcy possible in the near future.155 Lindauer argues further that Greek national 
banks may be one of the few winners if Greece were to default.156  
 Greece could also elect to leave the Eurozone, and return to the drachma as its 
national currency. This can be considered a default as well, Landon argues, because if 
Greece decides to leave or is forced to leave the euro, its debt write-off would be close 
to 100 percent, and the effects would be much more severe on international markets.157 
Furthermore, Greece does have good economic reasons to leave the Eurozone. If 
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Greece were to leave the Eurozone and re-adopt the drachma, it would then have the 
option to devalue its currency and become more competitive economically. If it can 
devalue its currency, exports will rise as more nations and companies do business with 
Greece and Greek companies, which will bring in cash to the nation. In the case of 
Argentina, one of the first actions of its new president was to first de-peg the peso from 
the dollar, and then once deemed necessary, devalue the peso to eliminate 
hyperinflation and return inflation rates to pre-crisis levels. The Argentinean economy 
stabilized afterward. However, if Greece was the first country to leave the Eurozone, it 
could lead to a massive bank run by those with euro deposits in national banks who do 
not want their euro-denominated deposits changed into drachmas. This response is 
expected, because once Greece officially adopts the drachma as its currency, it will be 
devalued at least slightly. It is important to note that the Argentinean economy was 
more competitive than Greece today (in terms of market flexibility, lower labor costs, 
etc.), which is an advantage over Greece. 
 Finally, Greece could continue to lobby harder for more debt forgiveness through 
European agencies, and continue to move along under the protective shield of bailouts, 
austerity measures, and Europe's emergency fund, the 2010 European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). Running under the supervision of the European 
Commission, and using the budget of the EU as collateral, the EFSM was initially 
designed to stem the Greek debt crisis. Its purpose now is to preserve the financial 
stability of Europe by providing EU and Eurozone member nations in economic turmoil 
with financial assistance.158 At this time it has been successful in preventing the crisis 
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from escalating any further, evidence of which is seen via multiple bailout packages and 
debt-forgiveness plans preventing a Greek default. However, the EFSM has virtually no 
chance to resolve the crisis. Thomson notes that the solution proposed by the EFSM is 
basically financial pain, consisting of austerity measures and small tax increases to 
curtail exorbitant government spending. He argues that these spending cuts would 
cause Greece's economy to shrink. A down economy, in which there is a period of 
temporary economic decline, generates fewer tax dollars for the government. 
Furthermore, fewer taxes pay for even less spending, so in order to reach deficit goals, 
Greece would have to cut spending again, further weakening its economy.159 Ultimately, 
these measures are unsustainable over time, and only prolong Greece's inevitable 
default and/or exit from the Eurozone. 
 
4.5 - The Future of the Eurozone 
 Greece has effectively partially defaulted on its debt, and further default is 
possible. It is merely a matter of when and how. If it does, the default will severely 
impact its main creditor nations (France, Germany, and the UK), and create a domino 
effect for the financial institutions and nations throughout the Eurozone that are heavily 
exposed to Greek debt. Currencies are extremely volatile, and markets very unforgiving. 
Losing a member nation due to rising debts will cause the euro to fall in value, and 
negatively impact its future as a currency. As it is, the Eurozone will require several 
years to recoup the damage its instability has created, and may even be deemed too 
risky to be held as a global currency in the near future. 
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 While Greece's troubles are situated as the most extreme of cases, they draw 
attention to similar problems in the Eurozone that also apply to the economies of other 
southern European countries. These nations have run up enormous government and 
household mortgage debts over the past decade, in addition to enjoying rapidly rising 
wage levels.160 As time draws closer to the date these nations must pay back what is 
owed, the worsening debt crisis makes it more difficult for them to repay debts, and 
instead must pass legislation to cut spending, raise taxes, and get national borrowing 
under control. 
 In the meantime, the IMF and ECB continue to do everything in their means to 
prevent a Greek default, while Greece is limited in its ability to raise additional capital 
and prevent a default. On February 12, 2012, Greek members of parliament passed an 
additional austerity plan that was demanded by the Eurozone and IMF in exchange for a 
$170 billion bailout to avoid default in March.161 In addition to the bailout, Greece 
completed a bond exchange with private creditors on March 12, at a loss for its creditors 
of approximately $141.4 billion.162 Without a payout in the form of financial aid to cover 
its March 2012 bond debt repayment, Greece was almost certain to default. Greece is 
now insolvent, and will require additional outside financial help in order to be able to 
repay not only this payment, but several more payments in the future. Its debt outlook 
downgrade to "probable default" in January 2012 has stirred up significant speculation 
skewed toward Greece defaulting in the near future. Since the bailouts and austerity 
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measures began in mid-2010, its government debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to rise at 
levels that make it extremely difficult to repay debts. The nation is barely surviving on 
the 8 billion euro loan paid in December 2011 by the IMF, EU, and the proceeds from 
treasury bill sales.163 On March 30, 2012, Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos 
conceded that the country may require a third bailout in the near future.164  
 The only means Greece has to raise additional capital is by selling treasury bills 
or from outside loans. Significant expense-related changes have already been made, in 
addition to all the austerity measures to cut spending, yet none have proven to be 
successful. As the nation's debt-to-GPD ratio continues to rise, the need for capital to 
pay off debts is ever more imperative. Creditors, banking institutions, and those 
invested in Greek bond debt have continued to try and postpone a default via the bailout 
packages and austerity measures for almost two years now. Although the exact 
repercussions of a default are difficult to predict, it would instill fear in global financial 
markets that contagion from the events could spread to other weak Eurozone member 
nations, causing the value of the euro to drop significantly. In the wake of a Greek 
default, Greece would certainly either leave the Eurozone on its own, or at least discuss 
exit strategies with the ECB in order to lessen the impact of political, economic, and 
social ramifications.  
 Postponing a Greek default via bailouts and austerity measures will be 
detrimental to the Eurozone in the long run. Thomas argues that new projections, in 
light of Greece's continuously shrinking economy and staggering debt load, cast new 
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doubt on whether Greece will ever be able to rise out of its downward financial spiral 
without defaulting on its debts.165 A recent IMF forecast notes that after ten years of 
austerity measures, spending cuts, tax increases, and bailouts, Greece's 2020 debt 
burden will remain at levels similar to its current load. Portugal, another recipient of 
bailout funds, has seen its borrowing costs rise recently. Portuguese bonds are closing 
in on 14.3 percent, reflecting the growing concerns that Portugal may default on its 
loans in the future as well.166 
 The euro sovereign debt crisis in 2010 has caused a shift toward Populist 
policies, with increased government representation by members from political parties 
that stress representation of ordinary citizens. In Greece and Italy especially, political 
parties and high-level officials that once dominated parliament and public opinion polls 
are being gradually replaced by others whom are Populist in nature. EU and member 
nation governments are continuing to scramble to prevent member state defaults, while 
also distancing themselves financially as far away as possible to avoid a contagion 
effect on their economy.167 Talks of a more integrated euro area are currently under 
way, and recently passed EU legislation and treaties are forcing Eurozone member 
nations to give up some of their sovereignty via control over their fiscal policies. While 
increases in sovereign debt load have been most pronounced in only a few Eurozone 
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member nations, they are becoming increasingly problematic for the currency union as 
a whole, creating fear of contagion.168 
 The variety of solutions recommended and implemented to combat the Greek 
debt crisis has been limited. Given past measures to resolve the crisis, which at this 
time consist of only bailouts and austerity measures, it seems as if the European 
Central Bank prefers to wait out the existing crisis as long as possible in order to 
determine what the outcome will be and see what future prospects will hold. EU 
member nations with strong economies, such as Germany and the UK, have elected to 
follow similar paths, and continued to observe from afar while proposing solutions to the 
crisis.  
 However, these nations especially have not helped out in much regard, merely 
proposing solutions without taking any action themselves. How long will it take for 
Germany to fully realize they have to pay out of their own pocket to help member 
nations in trouble financially before the Eurozone falls apart? The nation already knows 
in a sense, but politically it is unfeasible because it risks politicians losing office. The 
fact is the probability that Germany will ultimately "pay," providing financial assistance to 
Eurozone member nations in need of it, is high. Nevertheless, the longer Germany 
plays the role of an observer nation (even though it has contributed worthy amounts of 
capital to the bailouts) and waits to see what happens, the more money it will be forced 
to pay in the future. The contagion effect from the Greek debt crisis has been as 
predicted, affecting countries and financial institutions worldwide. Those exposed to 
Greek bond debt have seen their debt ratings downgraded by credit rating institutions 
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(notably by S&P), with an increase in the number of nations and banks downgraded as 
the crisis worsens. Until economically stronger nations such as Germany take a more 
active role in providing financial assistance to Greece, and ultimately Eurozone member 
nations in need, the Greek debt crisis is going to worsen the euro debt crisis, and 
spread the contagion outward at an exponential rate.  
 Greece is the current candidate to be the first to default on its debt and/or leave 
the Eurozone. Should any scenario prove to be true, the implications on those holding 
Greek bond debt will be severe, and we can expect those majority holders to be at risk 
of future downgrades themselves. Moreover, stocks worldwide will continue to stumble 
on Greek debt fears, and eventually fall if a Greek default occurs.  
 Haan, Berger, and Jansen argue that the major problem of the Stability and 
Growth Pact is its weak enforcement mechanisms.169 In order to abide by the rules 
outlined in the SGP, the European Central Bank must more effectively decide which 
bonds are worth investing in, or stop accepting government bonds as collateral. Even 
though there is a minimum rating bonds must hold before they can accept them, it was 
reduced from A- in 2008 (prior to the global financial crisis), to BBB- (junk-bond status), 
making them extremely risky to hold.170 For years the ECB has been too 
accommodating with its acceptance of government bonds as collateral, and as Bagus 
notes, it may be time for the ECB to stop its acceptance of them.171 
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 Another approach to solving, or at least improving the situation of the entire euro 
debt crisis, of which its origins are becoming more evident, is to implement a 
structuralist solution, and further integrate Eurozone member nation fiscal policies. One 
primary reason the Latin Monetary Union dissolved was because member nations did 
not integrate enough economically, which led to no political or economic union being 
formed. However, trying to integrate an individual Eurozone member nation's fiscal 
policies was, and still is, a very sensitive subject area because it reduces national 
sovereignty, but for the future of the Eurozone, it is imperative. Further integration will 
increase transparency and coordination of government financials, and prevent another 
tragedy similar to what the Eurozone has experienced thus far.  
 In order to stabilize the faltering Eurozone and promote European integration, 
some speculate as to whether Eurobonds should be introduced into the Union. In the 
United States in the 1940s, the US government advertised "buy war bonds, get behind 
your country" to raise capital.172 Perhaps now it should be "buy Eurobonds, get behind 
your European community." German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has been 
adamantly opposed to Eurobonds because of what her administration noted to be 
insolvency issues, briefly considered them as a potential solution to the euro debt crisis 
under increasing pressure from other Eurozone member nations. However, on 
November 24, 2011, Merkel reverted back to her original stance against Eurobonds, 
calling the proposal "extraordinarily distressing" and "inappropriate."173 The stance of 
Germany on Eurobonds and Merkel's lack of support for them places any notion of 
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using them as an alternative to bailouts dead in the water. Until Germany gets on board 
with using Eurobonds, there will not be enough political support to potentially move 
them forward. Many will agree that Germany and Merkel are in-line with their stance on 
Eurobonds, as the euro debt crisis is too far out of hand to rely solely on bonds to solve 
it. Policy changes must be considered equally as important. 
 In addition to needing Germany's support on any Eurobond legislation, the 
European Union's treaties would have to be modified as well. Yousuf argues that since 
changes need to be ratified and approved by each of the 27 EU member nations, the 
process for a Eurobond to even be formally approved could take years.174 He also notes 
that under a second scenario, Eurozone member nations would be permitted to issue 
common Eurobonds up to a certain percentage of their annual GDP. However, beyond 
this pre-determined level, individual governments would be responsible for issuing and 
backing the bonds they issue. 175 This version of a Eurobond plan would require all 
member nations, including those fiscally responsible and irresponsible, to be liable for a 
portion of each member nations' debt. It does not address the Eurozone's structural 
debt problems over the longer term, and would most likely be met with the same 
resistance as the original Eurobond plan.176  
 Bagus argues that for now, a 750 billion euro bailout plan, and the ECB incentive 
to buy government bonds have stopped the rise of bond yields, and been responsible 
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for this debt crisis containment, but government deficits must be controlled and 
restricted (effectively) by credible sanctions and penalties.177 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This research finds that recent measures taken by the European Union to 
counter the European sovereign debt crisis have begun to slightly improve the stability 
of the Eurozone. However, further political, economic, fiscal, and national integration, as 
well as a method to implement sanctions against member nations who do not abide by 
Eurozone guidelines, are imperative in order to return the euro's stability to pre-crisis 
levels. 
 Greece's admission into the Eurozone in 2001 is a decision that some fellow 
member nations are beginning to regret.178 Its long history of problems with its public 
debt was disguised by several years of strong economic growth, with one of the fastest 
growing economies from 2000 to 2007.179 However, the 2008 global financial crisis 
brought light to Greece's poor spending practices, and its national debt skyrocketed to 
$468 billion by early 2012.180  
 Since 2010, Greece has required bailouts and external financial aid to prevent a 
default on its debt. The EU, IMF, ECB, and wealthier Eurozone member nations have 
provided these bailout funds and loans in exchange for Greece agreeing to implement 
austerity measures in order to decrease its debt and reduce spending. While the crisis 
at hand has been postponed in the short term, the amount of money Greece requires to 
pull itself out of debt continues to increase, leading credit rating agencies to downgrade 
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Greek bond debt. The EU and IMF's heavy reliance on bailouts and austerity measures 
to combat the crisis are tools that are unsustainable over time. This will become more 
evident as the crisis worsens. Currencies have been very unforgiving as well, with 
Greece's instability negatively affecting the value of the euro. 
 Falling investor confidence has weakened the euro significantly, as many 
continue to question the future of the Eurozone if Greece were to further default on its 
debt. Over the last few years, the value of the euro has seen a downward trend in 
relation to the US dollar. Fear of the spread of contagion from Greece seems to be the 
main issue, and many are worried that a Greek default and exit from the Eurozone 
would cause other Eurozone member nations to follow suit. Greece's debt crisis has 
decreased the EU's financial stability, as investors ponder the effect a default would 
have on economic ties between Eurozone member nations and the international 
community. Major Eurozone governments have been criticized for a lack of political 
leadership, and signs of division within the European Central Bank are evident. 
Financial markets have shown concern in recent months that the Eurozone's political 
structures do not have the authority to deal with the economic problems at hand. 
However, in light of all these issues, one main underlying theme responsible for the 
turmoil plaguing the Eurozone is the lack of proper European integration. 
 The 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has done little to properly monitor the 
fiscal policies and situation of Eurozone member nations.181 Although members must 
abide by EUC-recommended budget deficit and national debt levels, many Eurozone 
member nations have not, and continue to not abide by these recommendations. 
                                                          
181
 Haan, Jakob de, Helge Berger, and David-Jan Jansen. "Why has the Stability and Growth Pact 
Failed?" International Finance 7.2 (2004): 236. 
77 
 
Eurozone budget discipline does not seem to be actively practiced because these 
values are not legally-binding. The March 2011 Euro Plus Pact was introduced as a 
more stringent successor to the SGP, requiring more integrated fiscal policy within the 
Eurozone. However, it is too early to tell if it has been successful in practice. 
 The cases of the Latin Monetary Union of the 19th century and the dollarization 
of Argentina in the early 2000s provide insight as to why not all currencies and their 
unions are set to succeed. When Argentina pegged its peso to the US dollar in 1998 to 
offset hyperinflation and stabilize the economy, it failed to significantly change enough 
of its monetary and fiscal policies. After less than three years, Argentina's economy 
suffered to such a great extent that the peso was unfixed against the dollar once again. 
Its value quickly depreciated, and was devalued shortly afterward. This devaluation was 
needed from the beginning in order to offset hyperinflation and increases in rising 
government debt. Argentina's lack of implementing the necessary policy changes is 
primarily responsible for the failure of its dollarization by 2002. The 19th century Latin 
Monetary Union's lack of political and economic integration led to member nations 
minting coins using illegal methods, causing them to be removed from the union. Even 
though there was a formal agreement on the rules of being a member and what they 
entailed, members did not follow membership guidelines.  
 The case of the LMU is similar to Greece in the Eurozone today, and many of the 
other Mediterranean nations, such as Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Eurozone member 
nations lack sufficient integration, which has caused them to stray from the guidelines 
outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact, and the Euro Plus Pact. Many continue to 
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worry that further instability will create a domino contagion effect, spreading from 
Greece to the other PIIGS nations, in the future. 
 Beyond the default itself, the Greek debt crisis has severe implications for the 
Eurozone, and international financial markets as a whole. Some fear that other 
Eurozone member nations facing severe austerity measures and large debt repayments 
may look at Greece as an example of an alternative to paying off debt by choosing to 
stop all payments and go into default. Appendix C on page 86 provides a table of 
government and public debts of European nations. Even though the Stability and 
Growth Pack requires EU member nations to have a debt to GDP ratio of no more than 
60 percent, slightly more than half are not abiding by these guidelines. In fact, the EU's 
debt to GDP ratio as of the third quarter of 2011 was 82.2 percent, more than one-third 
higher than required.182  
 Any country significantly exposed to the debts of other Eurozone member 
nations, notably Germany and France, would see their debt ratings sink almost 
overnight, as the domino effect of multiple Eurozone member nation defaults spills over 
and spreads throughout the region. The value of the euro would plummet against 
international currencies and fear of a complete Eurozone collapse would plague 
international markets. A further Greek default may also risk a complete lockup of the 
Greek economy, which would lead to a collapse and freeze of the Greek banking 
system.  
 There are few alternative solutions and outcomes to Greece's debt crisis, and 
none of them are particularly pleasant. The first option, in which Greece defaults on its 
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debt, would see Greece expelled from the Eurozone, and the implications of a default 
evident overnight, including a lockup of the Greek economy, collapse and freeze of the 
Greek banking system, the refusal of international banks to lend Greece new money, 
and cutoff of aid from the ECB. In a second option, Greece can inform foreign banks it 
cannot repay its loans on time, and then restructure its debt. This would be known as a 
partial default, where analysts expect at least 60 to 80 percent of Greek debt to be 
forgiven by banks and financial institutions.183 Just because it looks like this option is 
being chosen presently, it does not necessarily make it the permanent solution as the 
crisis continues. Greece could also choose to leave the Eurozone on its own in a third 
option, and return to the drachma as its national currency. This is considered a default 
as well, because Greece's debt write-off would be close to 100 percent. The last option 
for Greece is to continue to lobby harder for more debt forgiveness through European 
agencies, and continue under the protective shield of bailouts and austerity measures, 
Europe's emergency fund, and the EFSM. However, this scenario may be unsustainable 
over time, and prolonging a Greek default will only exacerbate the problems at hand 
and increase the cost of the default in the future. Eurobonds have also been proposed 
as an alternative solution to the crisis, in which each Eurozone member nation would be 
permitted to issue common Eurobonds up to a certain percentage of their GDP and be 
liable for a portion of each member nations' debt. However, until Germany and other 
significant Eurozone member nations can agree on the core components of this plan, it 
will continue to remain dead in the water and unfeasible.  
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 Although some may argue that the value of the euro falling is evidence that the 
Eurozone is in trouble, there is the possibility that the euro may benefit from being 
devalued. As goods and services become cheaper in Europe, and the cost of 
conducting business drops, there may be a significant increase in foreign direct 
investment in the region. These additional revenues will bring in tax dollars to both the 
host nation, and the EU as Europe again becomes competitive in different industries. 
The same argument holds true should Greece elect to leave the Eurozone, re-adopt the 
drachma as its currency, and then devalue it. At this time, it may be in Greece's best 
interests to leave the Eurozone, and try to improve its economy through an alternative 
venture. 
 All things considered, the failures of the LMU and the dollarization of Argentina 
help us determine which components of currency union operations are most vital to their 
longevity. The recent measures taken by the EU to reduce deficit spending and the EPP 
have slowed the spread of the European debt crisis, but deficit spending nations must 
stabilize their public debts, or risk their own default, as well as the Eurozone's potential 
demise. Recent measures taken by the EU, such as the Euro Plus Pact in March 2011, 
and more recently, the new European fiscal union from December 9, have begun to 
slightly improve the stability of the Eurozone, and counter the European sovereign debt 
crisis. However, further political, economic, fiscal, and national integration, as well as a 
method to implement sanctions against member nations who do not abide by Eurozone 
guidelines, are imperative in order to return the euro's stability to pre-crisis levels.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Timeline of the Greek Debt Crisis 
 
2001 
• January 1 -- Greece becomes the 12th nation to join the Eurozone, dropping the drachma 
 
2002 
• January 1 -- Euro coins and banknotes enter circulation 
 
2004 
• August -- Greece holds 2004 Summer Olympics at an estimated cost of $15 billion 
 
2005 
• March -- Cost of hosting the 2004 Olympics is beginning to have a noticeable effect on Greece's 
financial stability, as new government tries to impose an austerity budget to reduce Greek debt 
 
2007 
• March -- Austerity measures seem to be effective, as Greece's GDP increases by 4.1% 
 
2007 
• February -- Subprime mortgage crisis begins to affect the financial sector, which in turn leads to 
the 2007 to 2010 global financial crisis 
 
2008 
• September -- Irish government officially announces the country has entered a recession 
 
2009 
• November 5 -- Greek national debt increases from $225 billion in 2004 to $350 billion in 2009, 
while former Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou says 2009 Greek budget deficit will increase to 
12.7% of GDP 
 
• November -- Greece admits the data it submitted to gain entry into the Eurozone was falsified (its 
deficit has not been below 3% since 1999), similar to a previous announcement made by the 
conservative government in 2004 
 
• December 2009 -- Fitch becomes the first credit rating agency to cut Greek debt, lowering it from 
A- to BBB+ (below investment grade) 
 
2010 
• January 14 -- Greece unveils its new stability and growth program which aims to cut the Greek 
deficit from 12.7% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2012 
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• February 9 -- Greece's first austerity package implemented (10% cut in bonuses, 30% cut in 
overtime pay, salary freeze for all government employees, cuts in the number of public 
employees, and cuts in work-related travel compensation), with widespread strikes following 
 
• March 5 -- Greek parliament passes "Economic Protection Bill;" a second austerity package in 
which Greek citizens asked to accept lower bonuses and higher taxes, with widespread strikes 
following 
 
• April 11 -- Eurozone finance ministers approve $40 billion aid package for Greece, but it is 
rejected by Greek parliament, who admits the government may need additional help 
 
• April 23 -- EU, IMF, and Greek government approve $60.7 billion Greek bailout 
 
• April 27 -- Greek debt downgraded to BB+ (junk) status by S&P 
 
• May 2 -- Greece announces fourth round of austerity measures in exchange for $148.4 billion 
rescue package from the EU and IMF, to be paid out over three years  
 
• May 10 -- Global policymakers in the Eurozone install an emergency financial safety net fund 
worth $1 trillion to try and prevent the spread of contagion from the Greek debt crisis 
 
• May 18 -- Greece receives its first loan of $19.3 billion from the EU in order to repay immediate 
debt 
 
• July 7 -- Greek parliament passes pension reform measures, cutting benefits and raising the 
national retirement age from 60 to 65.  
 
• November 28 -- EU, IMF, and Irish government agree to a Irish $115 billion bailout in exchange 
for Ireland agreeing to implement austerity measures 
 
2011 
• January -- Fitch becomes the third credit rating agency to cut Greek debt to "junk" status. 
 
• May 2 -- former Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou rules out a debt restructuring 
plan for Greece 
 
• May 21 -- Papandreou and senior ECB officials reiterate that Greece must avoid debt 
restructuring and continue with budget cuts and privatizations to overcome the debt crisis 
 
• May 23 -- Greece announces a plan of privatizations in order to partially fund the $68 billion 
needed by 2015 to pay off some of its debt 
 
• June 8 -- Greece agrees to implement additional austerity measures and increase savings up to 
2015 
 
• June 13 -- S&P downgrades Greek debt from B to CCC, giving it the lowest credit rating in the 
world. Papandreou removes Papaconstantinou as finance minister and reshuffles his cabinet 
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• June 29 -- Papandreou wins parliamentary majority in favor of the proposed five-year austerity 
plan, which increases access to new funding 
 
• July 21 -- Eurozone leaders agree that Greece is in need of a second bailout package of $145 
billion, plus a $67 billion contribution by private sector bondholders by mid-2014 
 
• September  -- Greece adopts austerity measures, cutting high pensions by 20%, and passes a 
new property tax 
 
• October 27 -- Eurozone leaders reach a deal with private banks and insurers in which they will 
accept a 50% loss on all Greek government bonds held, for a total loss of over $134 billion. 
 
• October 31 -- Papandreou calls for a referendum on the second proposed bailout, but it is 
postponed until January 2012, and then withdrawn altogether 
 
• November 6 -- Papandreou solidifies a deal with opposition leaders to approve the second 
bailout before the next round of elections, and notes that he will step down from his role as Prime 
Minister 
 
• November 9 -- Papandreou resigns as Prime Minister, and the new government is sworn in 
 
• November 16 -- Greek government wins a vote of confidence, setting up the foundation for a 
second Greek bailout 
 
• December 9 -- All EU members, with the exception of the UK, agree to strict caps on government 
spending and borrowing under the new European Fiscal Union in order to promote increased EU 
member nation fiscal integration, and prevent the contagion from Greece and any debt crisis in 
the future 
 
• December 14 -- IMF announces that Greece's reforms are running behind schedule in most 
areas, and delaying its recovery 
 
2012 
• January 28 -- Greece reaches a tentative deal with its private creditors to write off a substantial 
portion of its debt, while Germany argues for more austerity cuts before additional loans can be 
disbursed 
 
• February 9 -- The EU, IMF, and the three parliamentary Greek coalition parties meet to discuss 
how to alleviate the worsening crisis. In exchange for new loans and rescue funds, Greece is 
required to cut 22% off the minimum wage, 15% off pensions, and to cut 15,000 private sector 
jobs. Unemployment in Greece raises to an all-time high of 21% 
 
• February 21 -- Eurozone member nations agree to provide Greece with a second bailout 
package of $170 billion, which is expected to bring government debt down to 120.5% of GDP by 
2020, and will launch a bond swap with private investors to help reduce and restructure Greece's 
debts 
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• March 9 -- Greece secures private-sector backing for the debt swap, with 85.8% of bondholders 
agreeing to take heavy losses on their investments. The write off is estimated to forgive 
approximately $130 billion of Greece's debts, equating to 53.3% loss on the nominal value, and a 
75% loss on the NPV of the bonds 
 
• March 12 -- Private creditor bond exchange completed for an estimated loss of $141.4 billion 
 
• March 31 -- Greek prime minister Lucas Papademos concedes that Greece may require a third 
bailout in the near future 
 
• April 3 -- Fitch announces that Greek debt will total about $430 billion at the end of 2012, 
compared with an estimated pre-swap total of $468 billion. Official creditors, primarily 
governments, will hold approximately 75% of that debt, compared to only 38% prior to the swap. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Acronyms 
 
EC - European Commission 
ECB - European Central Bank 
ECU - European Currency Unit 
EDC - European Debt Crisis 
EFSM - European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
EP - European Parliament 
EPP - Euro Plus Pact 
ERM - Exchange Rate Mechanism 
ESCB - European System of Central Banks 
EU - European Union 
GDC - Greek Debt Crisis 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
LAOS - Popular Orthodox Rally 
LMU - Latin Monetary Union 
ND - New Democracy 
NPV - Net Present Value 
OCA - Optimal Currency Area 
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PASOK - Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
PIIGS - Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain 
S&P - Standard and Poor's 
SGP - Stability and Growth Pact 
US - United States 
VAT - Value Added Tax 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Government and Public Debts of European Nations 
 
Government Gross Public Debt (in millions of euros) 
 
SOURCE: "Euro area government debt: Third quarter 2011 compared with second quarter 2011." 
Eurostat. (06 February 2012). 17 April 2012. 
  
Eur
SOURCE: "European public debt at
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APPENDIX D 
opean Public Debt at a Glance 
 
 a glance." CNN Business. (21 July 2011). 12 Decem
stat quarterly reports on Euro area government debt
 
ber 2011.184 
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